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UNITED STATES' USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,




0 VER THE LAST century, States have repeatedly used
coercive forms of economic power to force other
States in the world community to change their modes of
behavior as a response to perceived or real transgressions
of international norms and laws. Perhaps one of the most
striking examples of the use of punitive economic sanc-
tions' came after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles
has long been viewed as harsh retribution for Germany's
* *Visiting Lecturer in Law, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia; B.A. 1981,
Duke University; M.A., J.D. 1986, University of Southern California; LL.M. 1992,
Georgetown University. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Allan Mendelsohn,
not only for his helpful comments on earlier drafts, but for his unflinching encour-
agement in this endeavor as well.
I Economic sanctions are "intended to prevent, regulate or otherwise hinder
economic activity with another nation for the purpose of condemning or influenc-
ing the latter's actions or policies." Homer E. Moyer & Linda A. Mabry, Export
Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues and Policy Lessons of
Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & PoCv INT'L Bus. 1, 2 n.l (1987). The basis for sanc-
tions generally is to reduce political association with an aggressor or oppressor
State and to alter an economic relationship to increase support for victims and
decrease support for a perceived oppressor. Goler T. Butcher, The Unique Nature
of Sanctions Against South Africa, and Resulting Enforcement Issues, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 821, 840-41 (1987); see also John F. Cooke, Comment, The United States
1986 Emergency Economic Sanctions Against Libya - Have They Worked?, 14 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 195, 196 (1990); Jeffrey P. Bialos & Kenneth I. Juster, The Libyan
Sanctions: A Rational Response to State Sponsored Terrorism?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 799,
839-55 (1986) (discussing the legitimacy of using economic sanctions as a re-
sponse to State sponsored terrorism); Kenneth W. Abbott, Coercion and Communica-
tion: Frameworks for Evaluation of Economic Sanctions, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 781
(1987) (discussing the effectiveness of economic sanctions).
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role in the war.2 Indeed, many say that the fallout from
that treaty contributed to the calamitous rise of Adolf
Hitler, who galvanized German resentment to its harsh
terms as a means of furthering his own frightening
agenda.
The United States has not been afraid to use economic
sanctions to attempt to achieve a variety of legal and pol-
icy objectives. Over the last two years alone, for example,
the United States has invoked sanctions, including air and
travel related bans, against Iraq, Serbia (Yugoslavia), and
Haiti, designed in part to force their governments to
change certain behavior.4
The purpose of this article, however, is not to under-
take a general review of the widespread use of economic
sanctions by the world community or even by the United
States. Rather, it is to take a closer look at the use of a
variety of sanctions employed by the United States in the
international aviation arena.
The United States has time and time again resorted to a
cutoff of air links in instances where trading partners have
done something perceived as offensive to U.S. interests.
This historical review questions the reason for this re-
sponse. As should be evident from the analysis that fol-
lows, the answer is not always consistent, logical, or
satisfying. The United States cutoff of aviation links as a
sanction is presumably deemed potent because it under-
2 See, e.g., ANTHONY READ & DAVID FISHER, THE DEADLY EMBRACE 14 (1988).
One commentator cites sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy
for its invasion of Ethiopia in the 1930's as the first example of the modern use of
economic sanctions. D.G.M. Fourie, Trade Sanctions: A South African Perspective, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 921, 921 (1987). The Covenant of the League obliged
members to use economic sanctions in retaliation for acts of war. Moyer & Mabry,
supra note 1, at 3.
3 READ & FISHER, supra note 2, at 17-18.
4 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990) (blocking Iraqi
property and prohibiting certain transactions with Iraq); DOT to Set Yugoslavia Em-
bargo, TRAVEL WKLY., June 15, 1992, at 1; 138 CONG. REC. S7089-02 (1992); 138
CONG. REC. S5991-01 (1992) (congressional statements regarding possible sanc-
tions against Serbia); Exec. Order No. 12,775, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,641 (1991)
(prohibiting specified transactions with Haiti); Recap of Transportation Dept. Overseas
Air Travel Sanctions TRAVEL WKLY., June 14, 1993, at 65.
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mines the basic goals States generally have in promoting
development of their aviation sector: 1) States have a flag
airline as a symbol of prestige, success, and power in an
industrialized world; 2) For many developing countries,
flag carriers play a critical role in advancing commercial,
tourism, and cultural ties with other countries; 3) Flag car-
riers provide important diplomatic shuttling functions;
and 4) In many cases flag carriers provide a critical source
of hard currency. For these reasons, as well as others, de-
nying a State's airline its traditional or bargained-for ser-
vice to the United States, or the ability to have its tickets
issued in the United States, can be a serious blow for a
country, particularly where other nations follow suit.
This article is divided into two major parts. Part II
traces some of the more notable instances where the
United States has invoked economic sanctions and/or re-
pudiated bilateral agreement treaty obligations in the avi-
ation arena. Part III analyzes the propriety of U.S. actions
under international law. It is notable that many U.S. sanc-
tions in the aviation sector were invoked during the Cold
War and were directed against eastern bloc countries. If
these were the only examples of U.S. use of aviation sanc-
tions, then this would be merely an article about passing
historical trends. The widespread use of economic sanc-
tions in the aviation sector over the last few years sug-
gests, however, that the United States intends to employ
them on a continuing basis.5
5 In 1992, the United States imposed aviation sanctions against the former Yu-
goslavia at the behest of the State Department. In May of 1992, DOT denied the
applications of JAT for renewal of its foreign air carrier permit and exemption
authority to serve the United States with scheduled and charter flights. Applica-
tions ofJugoslavenski Aerotransport, C.A.B. Order No. 92-5-38 (1992). The ba-
sis for this action was a letter from Secretary of State Baker to the DOT,
requesting immediate termination of JAT's landing rights due to "Yugoslavia's
failure to guarantee the reopening of Sarajevo airport [for] ... humanitarian relief
flights and failure to guarantee the withdrawal of Serbian military forces from the
airport and surrounding hills." Id. at 3. At the time of the U.S. action, the Yugo-
slav-United States bilateral agreement had expired by its terms. Id. at 2.
Subsequently, the DOT issued sweeping Yugoslav travel and aviation related
prohibitions on the basis of an Executive Order from President Bush in June of
1992. See In re Suspension of Air Operations Between the United States and Yu-
1993] 293
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II. HISTORICAL REVIEW
A. THE USSR
The United States and the USSR signed a bilateral avia-
tion agreement in November of 1966. 6 That agreement
provided in its Route Annex for each country to designate
an airline to provide nonstop service on a New York-Mos-
cow routing.7 Article 2 of the agreement provided that
service between the two countries would commence fol-
lowing an exchange of diplomatic notes.8 Article 5 speci-
fied the circumstances for revocation of the right to
operate the agreed services:
1) substantial ownership/control of the designated carri-
ers not vested in nationals or agencies of the respective
party;
2) failure to follow the laws of the host country; or
3) failure to perform under the agreement.9
This article also included a consultation clause.' 0
Article 13 of the agreement is rather curious. It pro-
vided for suspension of operating rights for both coun-
tries' airlines "upon thirty days' notice" where the
"designated airline is prevented from operating flights on
the agreed services because of circumstances beyond the
control of the first Contracting Party."" The article then
provides a right of immediate service suspension under
"extraordinary circumstances ... beyond the control...
of that [c]ontracting [p]arty."' 2 While the intent of the
parties as to what this article was intended to cover is not
clear, what is clear is that these provisions did not openly
goslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, C.A.B. Order No. 92-6-12 (June 9, 1992). The
DOT Final Order precluded, inter alia, sale of tickets and issuance of airway bills to
or from Yugoslavia by United States carriers anywhere in the world and by foreign
carriers in the United States. Id. at 2-3.
Civil Air Transport Agreement, Nov. 4, 1966, U.S.-U.S.S.R., T.I.A.S. No.
6135, at 1909.
7 Id. at 1918.
Id. at 1910.
Id. at 1910-11.
10 Id. at 1911.
11 Id. at 1914.
12 Id.
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allow for suspension of service on political grounds. Arti-
cle 17 of the agreement does, however, provided for ter-
mination six months after either side gave notice of such
intent.' 3
On July 8, 1968, diplomatic notes were finally ex-
changed to commence services. Pan Am was designated
as the United States carrier and Aeroflot, not surprisingly,
was designated to fly the Soviet flag across the Atlantic.' 4
This exchange had been preceded by another exchange of
notes in May 1968, designed to alter the Route Annex and
give both countries the right to make intermediate techni-
cal stops on the route.' 5
By 1973, relations between the United States and the
USSR had warmed to the point where expansion of ser-
vice was agreed upon. A June 1973 proposal providing
for, inter alia, expansion of route authority for Pan Am to
Leningrad and for Aeroflot to Washington, D.C. was ap-
proved.'6 Increased frequencies of service were also stip-
ulated. But while these were positive signs, the protocol
memorializing the new service laid the seeds for future
curtailment of service between these countries. The route
annex that outlined the new service 17 governed opera-
tions only through March 31, 1975 and "thereafter such
number of flights as is subsequently agreed between the
Contracting Parties."' 8 Thus, absent further agreement,
air service between the two countries would end on April
1, 1975.
Following implementation of the protocol, Aeroflot
sought CAB permission to undertake charter flights to the
Is Id. at 1916.
14 Exchange of Notes Between the American Embassy and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the USSR, July 8, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6560, at 6020.
1- Exchange of Notes Between the American Embassy and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the USSR, May 6, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6489, at 4849.
16 Protocol Between the U.S. and USSR on Questions Relating to the Expan-
sion of Air Services, June 23, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 7658, at 1508.
17 Id. at 1508, 1510-11.
Is Id. at 1510.
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United States.' 9 Because the bilateral agreement did not
address charter services, commencement of such service
was "dependent upon general principles of reciprocity
and comity between nations. ' 20 The CAB administrative
law judge who reviewed Aeroflot's application recom-
mended amendment of the carrier's permit to allow char-
ter operations. 2' The CAB subsequently adopted the
administrative law judge's recommendation.2 2
Subsequent agreements between the United States and
the USSR in early and late 1975 served to further extend
and expand scheduled route service through October
1976.23 While the basis, if any, under which air services
continued between the two countries from October 1976
until March 1978 is not clear, some informal arrangement
was almost certainly in effect. A review of treaty history
reveals, however, that no further agreements between the
two countries were recorded until 1978. In March 1978,
the parties did formally agree to air service arrangements
through March 31, 1979.24 That agreement, inter alia, re-
affirmed the existing relationship between Aeroflot and
Pan Am that designated each carrier as the other's general
sales agent in its home country.25 This relationship had
been a cornerstone of the service provided by the two car-
riers from the time that the original bilateral agreement
was implemented.2 6 The "General Sales Agency Agree-
ment" between the two carriers not only mandated exclu-
sive reciprocal ticket sales, but provided for reciprocal
'9 General Dep't of Int'l Air Servs. (Aeroflot Soviet Airlines), C.A.B. Docket No.
25,862 (1974).
20 Id. at 1.
21 Id. at 5.
2 General Dep't of Int'l Servs. (Aeroflot Soviet Airlines), C.A.B. Order No. 74-
3-137, at 1 (1974).
23 Exchange of Notes Between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the American
Embassy, Dec. 9, 1974 and Apr. 16, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8058, at 562-63; Exchange
of Notes Between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the American Embassy, Dec. 4
and Dec. 22, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8217, at 3855.
24 Exchange of Notes Between the Department of State and the Soviet Em-
bassy, Mar. 3, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 8996, at 3056-57.
2.5 Id.
21i Aeroflot, C.A.B. Order No. 80-5-18, at 1-2 (1980).
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ground handling as well.27
Following expiration in March 1979 of the air service
arrangements negotiated in 1978, Aeroflot apparently
continued to provide service to the United States under
CAB exemption authority.28 That service was subse-
quently affected by dramatic world events. In response to
the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Sovi-
ets, the United States imposed a variety of economic sanc-
tions against the USSR, 9 including what must be
considered relatively light sanctions in the aviation area.
Specifically, in early January 1980, the CAB ordered Aer-
oflot to reduce the number of weekly roundtrips between
Moscow and N.Y./Washington, D.C. from three to two.3 0
The basis for the Board's action was a State Department
letter that cited unspecified "foreign policy considera-
tions" that made it in the "national interest" to reduce
Aeroflot's ability to service the United States. 3  The
Board concluded, in light of the State Department's re-
quest, that the public interest warranted the requested
reduction. 2
Although information currently available from the De-
partment of Transportation does not make it clear, Aer-
oflot's apparent response to the CAB order to reduce
scheduled frequencies was to substitute charter flights to
accommodate travelers. Aeroflot's permit allowed it to
perform "an unlimited number of on-route charters with-
out any requirement for advance approval" by the CAB.33
Three months after curtailing scheduled Aeroflot service,
the CAB, again in response to a request from the State
Department, acted to gain greater control over Aeroflot's
charter scheduling.3 4 Citing in part "foreign policy con-
27 Id.
28 Aeroflot, C.A.B. Order No. 80-1-43, at 1 n.1 (1980).
29 Moyer & Mabry, supra note 1, at 29.
30 C.A.B. Order No. 80-1-43, supra note 28, at 2.
S Id.
32 Id.
I. Aeroflot, C.A.B. Order No. 80-3-23, at 1 (1980).
4 Id.
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clusions" reached by the State Department, the CAB or-
dered Aeroflot to obtain advance approval from the
Director of the Bureau of International Aviation for each
charter flight and for any extra sections of scheduled ser-
vice beyond the two roundtrips per week previously
authorized. 5
Later in 1980, Aeroflot sought exemption authority
from the CAB to allow it to provide its own ticket sales
and ground handling services in the United States. 6
Coming on the heels of the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, Aeroflot's request was politically indelicate. The ap-
plication was, however, prompted by Pan Am's
suspension of service to the Soviet Union and an acknowl-
edgment that Pan Am could "no longer perform the sales
and other agency services provided for in the [agency]
agreement."' "3 In a show of good faith, and with a recog-
nition that without action, the United States could be left
without any service to the Soviet Union, the CAB granted
Aeroflot's temporary exemption request.3 8 What is note-
worthy is that by the time the Board had acted on Aer-
oflot's request, the bilateral agreement between the two
countries had lapsed "on the assumption that a mutually
acceptable pattern of service between the countries would
be established in further negotiations. '3 9 But in fact,
these negotiations never occurred. 40 At least in the CAB's
view, Aeroflot's flights to the United States after March
1979 were conducted entirely "at the discretion of the
United States government."'4 This reality would ulti-
35 Id. at 2.
36 Aeroflot, C.A.B. Order No. 80-5-18, at 2 (1980).
s7 Id. The CAB order granting the exemption sought by Aeroflot noted that:
The need for the Pan American-Aeroflot agreement stems from the
fact that the Soviet Union requires Pan American to use Aeroflot for
all sales, reservations... etc. in that country. [T]he Board has previ-
ously concluded that the consumer would be served best by impos-
ing a reciprocal agency relationship ....
Id.
. Id. at 2-3.





mately contribute to the decision by the CAB under a new
U.S. President, faced with a political crisis in Poland, to
terminate Aeroflot's U.S. landing rights in toto.
In late December 1981, President Ronald Reagan
caused transmission of a letter from the State Department
to the CAB asking the CAB to bar any further flights of
Aeroflot between the Soviet Union and the United
States.4 The letter explained that:
President Reagan has decided for foreign policy reasons
that the designated Soviet airline Aeroflot should not be
permitted to operate further services to or from the
United States. This decision was made in response to So-
viet involvement in the imposition of martial law in Poland
and the repression of the Polish people. This decision has
been communicated to the Soviet Government .... The
Department considers that such action would not conflict
with the US-USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement, as
amended.4
Citing statutory authority mandating both a "public inter-
est" rationale for altering a foreign air carrier permit sta-
tus and "foreign policy and defense needs of the United
States," the CAB tentatively withdrew Aeroflot's operat-
ing privileges. The CAB explained that "[i]n reaching
this conclusion, we share the State Department's assess-
ment that the curtailment of Aeroflot's service to the
United States does not conflict with our aviation agree-
ment with the Soviet Union, especially since there is pres-
ently no guaranteed level of service under the
agreement. ' 44 The CAB order was finalized after no re-
sponses were received from any interested party to the
show cause order issued in conjunction with its tentative
decision.45 The expansion of air service between the two
countries that had attended the thaw of the Cold War dur-
ing the 1970s screeched to a halt. Two years later, the
42 id. at 2.
43 Id.
44 Id.
4 . Aeroflot, C.A.B. Order No. 82-1-6 (1982).
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United States would completely eviscerate its aviation re-
lations with the USSR.
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet Air Force Unit shot
down Korean Airlines Flight 007.46 In response, Presi-
dent Reagan requested the CAB to take additional actions
against Aeroflot, including:
- reaffirming suspension of its operating rights,
- barring its right to sell air services in the United States,
- precluding carriage of traffic by United States carriers
where Aeroflot was on the itinerary, and
- precluding U.S. carriers from accepting tickets or ship-
ping documents issued by Aeroflot. 47
Not surprisingly, the CAB, despite recognition that "these
actions could create hardship for travelers and shippers
and could deprive U.S. airlines and travel agents of reve-
nues," acceded to the President's desires in a tentative de-
cision issued on the same day as his request.48 This
tentative decision was finalized on September 12, 1983.49
Aeroflot was not to recommence service to the United
States until 1986.
B. POLAND
The 1972 Polish bilateral agreement 50 was, in certain
respects, more generous to the Poles than its Soviet coun-
terpart was to the Soviets. Article 3 of the Polish bilateral
agreement provided each country with the right to desig-
nate its carrier of choice to serve the routes described in a
separate schedule.' Under article 5 of the bilateral
agreement, once each contracting party had granted regu-
46 Letter from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to Dan McKin-
non, Chairman, C.A.B. (Sept. 8, 1983).
47 Id. at 1.
41 Soviet Attack on Korean Airlines Flight 007, C.A.B. Order No. 83-9-43, at 3
(1983).
49 Soviet Attack on Korean Airlines Flight 007, C.A.B. Order No. 83-9-58
(1983).
50 Air Transport Agreement, July 19, 1972, U.S.-Polish People's Republic,
T.I.A.S. No. 7535.
-1 Id. at 4270.
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latory assent to service startup, operating permission
could only be revoked under specified situations:
1) failure to qualify under the laws and regulations of
the other contracting party,
2) failure to follow normal aircraft operating procedures
in force in the other party's territory, or
3) ownership/control no longer vested in the con-
tracting party or its nationals.5 2
Article 5 also precluded immediate suspension of service
pending consultations except under the most narrow of
circumstances.53
Article 9 of the Polish bilateral agreement represented
generous capacity requirements in that it placed no re-
strictions on the number of flights or the size of aircraft
that could be flown on designated routes.54 In contrast to
the Soviet bilateral agreement, provisions in the Polish
counterpart permitted ticket sales outside of the desig-
nated carrier's host countries. Furthermore, there was no
requirement for a reciprocal general sales agency rela-
tionship.5 5 The Polish bilateral agreement was notewor-
thy as well for its inclusion of an arbitration clause and a
one-year wind-down period to follow notice of termina-
tion by either party.5 6
In 1976, the Polish bilateral agreement was amended in
fairly dramatic ways. The amendments were necessitated,
in large part, because Poland was unable or unwilling to
implement that part of article II of the Polish bilateral
agreement. This part of the agreement afforded the U.S.-
designated carrier the right to sell air transportation in
Poland for Polish currency and by implication required
the Polish government to convert that currency into dol-
lars. These "Supplementary Understandings," contained
in an exchange of notes between the American Ambassa-
52 Id. at 4271.
.11 Id. art. 4(B).
5 Id. art. 9(E).
55 Id. art. 11 (B).
- Id. arts. 13 and 15.
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dor to Poland and the Polish First Deputy Minister of
Transport, indicated that while the U.S. airline would en-
joy the right to sell transportation within Poland for freely
convertible currency, all sales of transportation in Poland
for Polish currency would have to be made by the desig-
nated airline of Poland, LOT,57 acting as general sales
agent. But unlike Aeroflot, LOT was not required to sell
its tickets in the United States through Pan Am, the desig-
nated airline of the United States.
As a quid pro quo for the United States to agree to this
scheme, Poland agreed to sell through LOT not less than
the equivalent of $4.5 million in air services for Pan Am in
Polish currency. 58 In addition, despite the laudatory open
capacity language of the original bilateral agreement, the
exchange of notes included a specific limitation on flight
frequencies and the number of seats permitted to be
made available on flights for the period of November 1,
1976 to October 14, 1977. 59 Finally, the exchange of
notes contained a rather curious series of paragraphs con-
cerning consultation requirements:
In the event the Polish authorities cannot fulfill the guar-
anteed level of sales provided... above, or if either coun-
try believes that a fundamental change of circumstances
has occurred, prompt consultations would be held, at the
request of either country, to make appropriate adjust-
ments in these supplementary understandings. If agree-
ment on such adjustments cannot be reached within 60
days from the commencement of consultations, [the bilat-
eral agreement] shall thereupon be deemed to have been
amended to reduce the frequency levels to 3 roundtrip
flights per week for each airline. 60
The exchange of notes concluded with an agreement that
consultations would be held prior to April 30, 1979. If no
consensus to amend the agreement was reached at that
.7 Exchange of Notes Between the American Ambassador and the Polish First
Deputy Minister of Transport, Aug. 26, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 8469, at 243-44.
'" Id. at 244.
. Id. at 245-46.
6, Id. at 247.
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time, the bilateral agreement between the two countries
would "automatically terminate on October 14, 1979."6
Approximately one year after entering into the air
transport agreement, Pan Am and LOT apparently pro-
posed introduction of dramatically lower fares. 62 In re-
sponse, the American ambassador indicated to his Polish
counterpart that he was concerned by the "possibility...
that these experimental fares, once introduced, could be-
come permanent even though they might later prove to
have a disruptive effect on the market."6 Both countries
agreed that the experimental fares would remain in effect
only through the spring of 1978 and would be subject to
renegotiation at that time. 64 In acceding to this limiting
request by the United States, the Polish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs also insisted that "consultations be carried
out as soon as possible regarding the unresolved air trans-
port problems between the Polish Peoples Republic and
the United States of America."' 65 No explanation was of-
fered as to what precisely these "problems" were that re-
quired resolution in the minds of the Poles. In an
exchange of notes in the summer of 1978, the United
States and Poland merely agreed to certain revisions and
extensions of the existing amended bilateral agreement.66
The most significant new provision shortened the termi-
nation date to December 31, 1978.
In late December 1978, new provisions to the expiring
bilateral agreement were negotiated. 68 Highlights of the
new agreement included:
61 Id.
62 Exchange of Notes Between the American Ambassador and the Polish Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 13 and 16, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 9042, at 3887.
(13 Id.
64 Id. at 3887-88.
65 Id. at 3890.
- Exchange of Notes Between the American Embassy and the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, June 19 and Aug. 11, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9192.
67 Id. at 241.
- Exchange of Notes Between the American Embassy and the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 29, 1978 and Jan. 15 and 30, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9225.
30319931
304 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
- a liberal pricing regime,69
- a new financial structure to govern guaranteed sales by
the Polish-designated airline on behalf of the U.S.-des-
ignated airline,
- expansion of charter service, and
- a change of gauge provisions. 70
These broadbrush amendments to the original bilateral
agreement also set out a new termination clause:
The foregoing understandings and any other necessary
matters will be reviewed in consultations at any time, at
the request of either Party, and in any event during the
latter part of 1981. If agreement on continuation, amend-
ment or recision of these understandings is not reached by
March 31, 1982, the Agreement will terminate on that
date.7
Ultimately, the Poles did not get the full benefit of their
bargain with the United States - for reasons completely
unrelated to the aviation relationship between the two
countries. During the years subsequent to the implemen-
tation of the newly amended bilateral agreement, Poland
faced serious economic and political problems. Eventu-
ally, the Polish Party Central Committee replaced its party
chairman with General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had
served as President and Defense Minister. Jaruzelski was
given broad domestic authority to restore Poland's totter-
ing economy.72 As the situation in Poland continued to
deteriorate, and the Soviets conducted threatening mili-
tary exercises around the country,73 Jaruzelski "issued a
martial law decree drastically restricting civil rights ... [in
which] [t]he government banned public gatherings and
demonstrations" and made widespread arrests.74 The
country's emerging free labor movement, Solidarity, was
69 Id. at 908-10.
70 Id. at 910-12.
71 Id.
72 Moyer & Mabry, supra note 1, at 63.
71 Id. at 62.
74 Id. at 64.
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ordered shut down.75
The response of western European leaders, and Presi-
dent Reagan, was viewed by some as tepid: "[w]hile ordi-
nary people in the West reacted quickly and angrily to the
crackdown in Poland, their governments responded at
first with an abundance - some said an overabundance -
of caution."' 76 Apparently there was some confusion
within the U.S. government as to whether Jaruzelski's ac-
tions came at the behest of the Soviet Union or sought
merely to head off Soviet intervention." Imposition of
martial law by Polish military leaders came at a time when
the country was facing:
an economic crisis of almost unimaginable proportions.
The problems extend[ed] beyond food shortage and
strikes, and involve[d] more than cynical hoarding in a
monetary system that [wa]s in complete disarray. Above
all, Poland's shredded economy [wa]s the result of social
disintegration, the product of sullen workers confronting
an alien state.78
In response to the declaration of martial law in Poland,
President Reagan, during a speech on December 23,
1981, declared his intention to suspend aviation relations
between Poland and the United States. 79 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the State Department advised the CAB that the Presi-
dent had decided to suspend LOT's operating rights in
the United States effective immediately. Additionally, the
current bilateral agreement was to be considered sus-
pended until further notice.80 The CAB, in concurrence
with the President's action, issued a show cause order in-
quiring why a tentative order suspending LOT's operat-
ing rights should not be made final two days later."'
In its necessarily hurried response to the order, LOT
75 Id. at 60.
76 World Reaction: Semi-Tough, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1981, at 19.
77 Id.
78 Poland's Ordeal. Troops Can't Fix the Economy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1981, at 22.
-: Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT), C.A.B. Order No. 81-12-155, at 1 (1981).
" Id.
81 Id. at 1-2.
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suggested that the President's decision was "unlawful and
inconsistent with the United States/Poland Bilateral
agreement Air Transport Services Agreement. '82 LOT
contended that the President had not taken any legally
cognizable action to effectively suspend the United
States/Poland bilateral agreement.8s The CAB pointed
out, however, that the State Department in fact had ad-
vised it to the contrary. Furthermore, the CAB stated that
it felt "constrained to follow the advice of the State De-
partment, considering its responsibility and expertise with
regard to that issue."18 4
LOT also argued that the bilateral agreement, as
amended, was effective through March 31, 1982, a date
that could not be accelerated due to the requirement of a
one year notification of termination.8 5 Without citing to
any authority, the CAB explained that:
Obviously, the President's action is of the most extraordi-
nary nature, brought about by exceedingly serious world
events. Clearly, under such circumstances, there resides
in the President and the Executive Branch of the United
States government, ample authority to suspend applica-
tion of an Executive Agreement between the United States
and a foreign country, whether or not such a suspension is
provided for under the specific terms of the Agreement.
This is a political question which is clearly one for the
President. a
Finally, LOT argued that it had not received sufficient no-
tice to adequately respond to the CAB's precipitous ac-
tion. The Board was similarly unsympathetic to this
argument:
12 Polskie Linie Lotnicze (LOT), C.A.B. Order No. 81-12-171, at 1 (1981).
Is Id. at 2.
84 Id.
's Id. at 3.
" Id. at 2.
'7 Id. Robert Reed Gray, then U.S. Counsel to LOT, recalls with disbelief that
the airline was served with a proposed order the day after Christmas, Saturday,
December 26, and given until Monday the 28th of December to respond. Inter-
view with Robert Reed Gray, United States Counsel to LOT (Aug. 5, 1993) (notes
on file with author).
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While the time for response was short, the time granted
was reasonably related to exigencies of the situation. LOT
had notice of the Board's probable action with the Presi-
dent's speech of December 23; LOT's attorney was per-
sonally served the morning of December 26; and LOT's
agent in New York was personally contacted and notified
of the service on LOT's attorney, and agreed to accept
such service.8 8
In any event, the CAB explained that its suspension of
LOT's operating permit was merely a formality in view of
the President's action in suspending operation of the bi-
lateral agreement.8 9
Ultimately, the Poles declined to appeal the CAB's ac-
tions in U.S. courts. Rather, they sought international ar-
bitration, pursuant to the bilateral agreement, something
in which the United States was not, according to one in-
terested observer, anxious to participate.90 After an ex-
tended period of time during which the United States
"dragged its feet" in the appointment of arbitrators, new
negotiations were opened aimed at re-establishing a bilat-
eral agreement relationship.9 ' One of the conditions im-
posed by the United States for re-establishment of such a
relationship was that the Poles abandon the claims sought
to be arbitrated - which is precisely what occurred.9 2
C. CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Unlike the cases of Poland and the USSR, the United
States never acted during the Cold War period to suspend
aviation relations with Czechoslovakia. It did, however,
create obstacles to the profitable operation of CSA, the
Czechoslovak airline, in the United States. The February
1969 Air Transport Services bilateral agreement between
Czechoslovakia and the United States tracked its Polish
M LOT, C.A.B. Order No. 81-12-171, supra note 82, at 2.
-) Id. at 3.
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counterpart in many ways.95 For example, the Czech
agreement contained virtually the same revocation clause
as the one contained in the Polish agreement. The con-
sultation and arbitration clauses were of a similar nature.
The capacity and frequency language also paralleled the
Polish bilateral agreement, although the Czech agreement
provided that any consultations called for by either con-
tracting party must begin within a period of sixty days
from the date that the other contracting party received the
request for consultation.94
Similar to the Polish agreement, the Czech bilateral
agreement apparently represented stated goals of the two
countries as opposed to an operational blueprint. At-
tached to the bilateral agreement was a letter dated the
same day as the agreement from the President of the dele-
gation of Czechoslovakia, Martin Murin, to the U.S. am-
bassador, Jacob Beam. In spite of the language of the
agreement itself, the letter guaranteed the United States
only most favored nation treatment for ticket sales and
marketing activities of its designated carrier, not national
treatment.95 Apparently, as with the Poles, the Czechs
could not assure the United States that when selling tick-
ets in Czechoslovakia, Pan Am would be able to accept
and convert Czech crowns into American dollars. The let-
ter also provided that:
At a time no later than twenty-two months after the Czech-
oslovak designated airline inaugurates scheduled service
to the United States, both Contracting Parties will consult
for the purpose of confirming that mutually acceptable
conditions have been achieved for the airlines of each
Contracting Party to conduct their business activities in
the territory of the other ... on the basis of implementa-
tion of Article X [which provides for profit repatriation in
convertible currency] to a mutually acceptable extent. 96
11.1 Air Transport Agreement, Feb. 28, 1969, U.S.-Czech., T.I.A.S. No. 6644.
114 Id. at 408-13.
,. Id. at 417.
J6 Id.
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The letter then noted that the bilateral agreement would
terminate automatically unless mutually acceptable condi-
tions were developed for the period beginning twenty-two
months after February 28, 1969. 97
In May 1972, following a protracted and difficult nego-
tiation, a protocol was signed in Prague, which amended
the February 1969 bilateral agreement. 98 The key provi-
sions of that protocol included:
- CSA, the Czechoslovak designated airline, would be
required to appoint Pan Am, the U.S.-designated car-
rier, as its exclusive general sales agent and airport
ground handling agent in the United States; CSA was
no longer to be allowed to sell its own tickets or do its
own ground handling in the United States;
- Pan Am was granted the right to continue to sell its
tickets within Czechoslovakia for convertible cur-
rency; CSA would continue to sell Pan Am tickets
within Czechoslovakia for local currency; and
- The parties agreed to consultations prior to May 31,
1974 if either sought such consultations for purposes
of extending the original air transportation
agreement. 99
In 1974, the countries extended the agreement for an ad-
ditional year subject to minor amendment. 0 0 The same
bilateral agreement was extended once more in 1975 for a
period running until the end of December 1976.'0
In 1977, the bilateral agreement was again amended. 10 2
The significance of this new agreement was that in return
for a two year extension of the bilateral agreement by the
97 Id.
98 Protocol Modifying and Extending the Agreement of Feb. 28, 1969, May 24,
1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7356.
- Id. at 909-11.
- Exchange of Notes Between the American Charge d' Affairs ad interim and
the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 28, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 7881.
10, Exchange of Notes Between the American Charg6 d'Affairs ad interim and
the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 17 and July 29, 1975, T.I.A.S.
No. 8132, at 1744.
102 Exchange of Notes Between the American Charg6 d'Affairs ad interim and
the Czechoslovakia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 12, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8868.
19931 309
310 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
United States, the Czechs agreed that CSA would "under-
take a two-year sales quota objective for interline sales on
the United States designated airline's worldwide system of
2,000,000 dollars plus any amount by which actual 1976
interline sales by the Czechoslovak designated airline are
less than 891,400 dollars."' 0 3 This sales requirement be-
came a permanent fixture. Year after year, CSA was re-
quired to generate specified amounts of interline revenue
for Pan Am.'0 4 Eventually, the interline sales quotas and
other requirements imposed in CSA's operating permit by
the CAB came to be viewed by the airline as unreasonable
and unfair.
In 1982, CSA petitioned the CAB for relief from a
number of these requirements. Specifically, the CSA peti-
tion sought to permit CSA to appoint a ground handling
agent other than Pan Am, dispense with the requirement
that CSA appoint Pan Am as its general sales agent in the
United States, and relieve CSA of the net interline sales
requirement for 1983 of 1.4 million dollars. 0 5 CSA's pe-
tition traced the history of the bilateral aviation relation-
ship between Czechoslovakia and the United States. This
historical review noted two instances when the United
States took punitive measures against CSA in retaliation
for actions taken by the Czechoslovak government.
After receiving its first section 402 permit from the
United States on January 12, 1970,106 CSA expended
upwards of $200,000 to obtain a lease and specially de-
sign and outfit ground floor ticket offices on Fifth Avenue
in New York. 0 7 When, in 1972, Czechoslovakia contin-
ued to maintain that Pan Am, like other foreign airlines,
would not be permitted to sell its own tickets in Czecho-
slovakia for Czech crowns, the United States adopted the
position that CSA would no longer be permitted to sell its
los Id. at 1071.
-o See Petition of Czechoslovak Airlines for Certain Exemptions, C.A.B. Docket
No. 41,654 (Aug. 18, 1983).
105 Id. at 1-2.




own tickets in the United States. 08 According to the
Czechs, however, they were merely treating Pan Am on a
most favored nation basis since no foreign carriers were
allowed to sell their own tickets for Czech crowns in
Czechoslovakia. 0 9 The United States rejected this argu-
ment and terminated CSA's right to sell its tickets in the
United States. This action deprived CSA of effective use
of the Fifth Avenue ticket office, constructed at a substan-
tial expense.
Having invested so heavily in a New York ticket office,
CSA attempted to determine in 1978 whether it would be
permitted to sell its own tickets within the United States at
some future date." l0 In the alternative, CSA sought
a simple statement [from the United States government]
confirming the original 1972 restriction and indicating
that CSA's ability to sell its own tickets would not soon be
restored. With such a statement, CSA hoped that it might
be able to rely upon the doctrine of force majeure and thus,
in some small measure, contain the scope of its potential
liability for cancellation of the 15-year office lease."'
The U.S. government refused to respond in either direc-
tion to CSA's inquiry. 1 2 Ultimately, CSA abandoned its
lease in New York and suffered hundreds of thousands of
dollars in losses as a result." 3 CSA's misfortune with its
ticket offices extended from New York to Chicago.
CSA opened its Chicago office in the late 1960's and
hired a number of U.S. citizens." 4 In the early 1980's, a
staff member of the American Embassy in Czechoslovakia
was stopped on her way back from a trip to West Ger-
many. Czech authorities searched her car and allegedly
108 Id. at 5.
-o Id. at 5, 7-8.
11o Id. at 9.
- Id. at 9-10.
112 Id. at 10.
I's Id.
1 I4 ld. at 28-29 n.2.
1993]
312 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
found a cache of drugs." 5 As a result, the Czech govern-
ment informed the State Department that this individual
was persona non grata in Czechoslovakia.' 6 The individual
staffer, as well as the State Department, contended that
the staffer had been set-up by Czech authorities in order
to expel her from the country. "7 Accordingly, the State
Department informed the Czech government that failure
to remove the staffer from the status of persona non grata
would result in retaliation by the United States. The
Czechs refused to back down and so did the United
States. CSA's Chicago office, established at considerable
expense and employing mainly U.S. nationals, was
promptly ordered shut down." 8
D. LEBANON
The history of the aviation relationship between the
United States and Lebanon prior to 1985 is sketchy at
best. An original bilateral agreement was signed in Sep-
tember 1972.' 9  That agreement provided for the
designation by each government of airlines to serve Bei-
rut and points within the United States.' 20 An exchange
of notes at the time that the bilateral agreement entered
into force provided for the agreement's automatic termi-
nation, subject to intergovernmental consultations, in
May 1976.12' The bilateral agreement was extended in
mid-1976, subject to certain conditions imposed by the
United States. 22
By 1977, apparently the only air service between Leba-
non and the United States was being flown by a Lebanese
-' Interview with Allan Mendelsohn, Counsel to CSA (June 10, 1992) (Notes




119 Air Transport Agreement, Sept. 1, 1972, U.S.-Lebanon, T.I.A.S. No. 7546.
120 Id. at 253.
121 Id. at 263.
22 Exchange of Notes Between the American Embassy and the Lebanese Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Mar. 29, May 18, and May 25, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 8304.
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charter carrier, TMA.' 23 Middle East Airlines (MEA), the
Lebanese passenger carrier, was not flying to the United
States. The U.S. designated airline, Pan Am, also offered
no service.1 2 4 In 1982, however, the Lebanese indicated a
desire by MEA to provide limited air service between Bei-
rut and New York.1 25 The United States agreed to permit
start-up of such service, and the Lebanese agreed to per-
mit passenger or cargo service by U.S. carriers.12 6
In June 1985, TWA flight 847 was hijacked to Beirut. 27
The failure thereafter of the Lebanese to cooperate in
prosecuting or extraditing the hijackers 2 8 caused anger
and consternation at the highest levels of government in
the United States. Shortly thereafter, President Reagan,
pursuant to section 1114(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,129 determined that "Lebanon [wa]s acting in a man-
ner inconsistent with the convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft." As a result, Reagan an-
nounced the suspension of all operating rights for all car-
riers servicing Lebanon, including rights through
interline agreements. President Reagan also suspended
the rights of MEA and TMA to service the United
States.13 0
Two days after the President's announcement, the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) issued a show cause
order in an attempt to further expand upon the matter.'
The proposed DOT additions to all section 402 permits
held by foreign carriers and to all exemptions held by
123 Exchange of Notes Between the American Ambassador and the Lebanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 24 and Oct. 13, 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8722, at
7479.
124 Id. at 7479-80.
125 Exchange of Notes Between the United States Department of State and the
Lebanese Embassy, Dec. 22, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10,489.
126 Id.
127 BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE
HAPHAZARD LEGAL REGIME 59 (1988).
128 Id.
'- 49 U.S.C. app. § 1514 (Supp. III 1991).
'so Presidential Determination No. 85-14, 50 Fed. Reg. 31835 (1985).
13, In re Security of Aircraft and Safety of Passengers Transiting Lebanon,
D.O.T. Order No. 85-7-15 (July 2, 1985).
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both U.S. and foreign carriers stipulated that "effective
immediately and until further order of the Department,
the holder and its agents shall not sell in the United States
any transportation by air which includes any type of stop
in Lebanon."' 32 The purpose of this requirement, ac-
cording to the DOT, was to "prohibit the sale in the
United States of any ticket or the issuance in the United
States of any airway bill with Lebanon in the itinerary, re-
gardless of whether the flight in question serves the
United States."1 33
MEA argued that the DOT's proposed expansion of
President Reagan's actions was unnecessary. The DOT
summarized MEA's contentions: "[N]o American carriers
serve Beirut ... few Americans travel there and ... the
suspension of all air service between the United States
and Lebanon would not prevent future hijackings." 134
The DOT was not impressed with MEA's arguments. It
indicated that the "public interest" required it to actively
discourage travel between Lebanon and the United
States.'35 Further, the DOT claimed that it believed the
Beirut airport was unsafe for American carriers and citi-
zens, and that, as a matter of foreign policy, the airport
should not be used until properly secured by Lebanon's
government.' 36 The DOT emphasized that it had no de-
sire to punish MEA, but "the United States government
views the closing of Beirut Airport as one step in its fight
against terrorism and its supporters."' 3 7
While the DOT terminated MEA's authority to serve
the United States,13 8 it continued to allow MEA to
wetlease a 747 to Egyptair for use by that carrier on char-
ter flights between the United States and various Euro-
532 Id. at 2.
133 Id.
,14 In re Security of Aircraft and Safety of Passengers Transiting Lebanon,
D.O.T. Order No. 85-7-45, at 1 (July 9, 1985).





pean points.' 39 The basis for this decision was a finding
by the DOT that the airplane in question was operated by
Egyptair with its own colors and that Egyptair operations
were unrelated to MEA's.' 40 The DOT added certain re-
strictions on the use of the aircraft to ensure that Egyptair
would fly it exclusively and that the aircraft would not
transit Lebanon for any reason. The DOT also indicated
that the aircraft would be subject to additional security
measures upon landing in New York. 14
The aviation sanctions with respect to Lebanon are still
in place. In fact, they became the subject of a DOT en-
forcement effort in 1993 that generated widespread press
attention. Specifically, the DOT determined that as Luf-
thansa had violated certain ticketing restrictions included
in the Lebanon order, it would be heavily fined. 42 The
DOT disclosed that numerous other airlines were under
investigation on the basis of discovery that as many as
25,000 reservations had been made in violation of the
DOT order. 143 The DOT also apparently discovered that
MEA had been issuing multiple tickets to passengers,
routing U.S. outbound passengers on other international
carriers from the United States to Europe, with connec-
tions on MEA between Europe and Beirut issued on a
separate ticket that apparently showed a Damascus or Am-
man destination - even though the flights actually only
operated to Beirut. 144 In October 1993, DOT announced
a financial settlement with MEA emanating from the al-
leged violations by the carrier of the 1985 order. DOT
indicated that it would "issue a consent order directing
[MEA] to cease and desist" from violating departmental
'-9 In re Middle East Airlines Airliban, S.A.L. (MEA), D.O.T. Order No. 85-7-
14, at 2 (July 2, 1985).
140 Id.
'41 Id. at 2.
142 DOT Cracks Down on Illegal Transportation to Lebanon, AVIATION DAILY, June 10,
1993, at 393.
143 Id.; DOT Presses Industry to Undo Reservations for Lebanon, TRAVEL WKLY., June
14, 1993, at 65.
14 AVIATION DAILY, supra note 142, at 393.
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restrictions. 45 The carrier was also assessed a $500,000
fine, $275,000 of which will not have to be paid if MEA
commits no further violations. 46
E. SYRIA
Safe in Syria's London Embassy, Nezar Mansur Hindawi
could sit back and contemplate his day's work. A few
hours before, on the morning of April 17, Hindawi had
escorted his pregnant Irish girlfriend ... to... Heathrow
Airport, where she planned to board an El Al jumbo jet.
What she didn't know was that the flight bag Hindawi had
given her contained 10 pounds of explosives set to go off
on the flight [to] Tel Aviv. 14 7
El Al's airport security personnel discovered the bomb
before Hindawi's girlfriend boarded the plane. Eventu-
ally, following his capture, Hindawi disclosed that he had
been flown to London on Syrian Arab Airlines to carry
out an attack on the El Al plane. He had been escorted by
a Syrian intelligence officer. Hindawi was allegedly carry-
ing a Syrian passport with a false name. 14  He also dis-
closed to British investigators Syrian complicity in the
bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that resulted in the
death of American military personnel. 49 Hindawi eventu-
ally revealed that Syrian armed forces personnel had in
fact designed and planned the El Al attack and had sup-
plied the cash and explosives to carry it out. 5 °
In response to the disclosures of complicity and con-
spiracy by the Syrian government and military, the British
took the extraordinary measure of breaking diplomatic re-
lations with Syria.'"' The American response was more
measured. In November 1986, President Reagan directed
"15 DOT Levies Fine on Middle East Airlines for Violations of Lebanon Travel Ban, U.S.
Dep't of Transp. Press Release, Oct. 14, 1993 at 1.
146 Id.
147 A Syrian Smoking Gun?, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1986, at 40.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Jill Smolons, Questions About a Damascus Connection, TIME, Oct. 20, 1986, at 53.
'5' Michael Serrill, Making the Syrian Connection, TiME, Nov. 3, 1986, at 39.
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the Secretary of Transportation to take necessary actions
to preclude the sale of air transportation in the United
States on Syria's flag carrier.'3 2 The DOT responded by
issuing a show cause order proposing to ban such sales in
the United States.15 The basis of the show cause pro-
ceeding was that:
Syria is a party to the Chicago Convention. One of the
underlying principles of the convention is the safe and or-
derly development of international air transport. Pursu-
ant to Chapter VI of the Convention, the International
Civil Aviation Organization has adopted standards which
are binding on the parties to the Convention, including
Annex 17's standard 4.1.3. which requires States to "take
the necessary measures to prevent weapons or any other
dangerous devices . . . from being introduced, by any
means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in the
carriage of passengers." The actions of the Government
of Syria not only contravene Syria's general and specific
obligations under international law and the Convention,
but are by their very nature antithetical to the premises of
the Convention governing the conduct of aviation
services. 154
The DOT finalized the proposed order shortly
thereafter. 55
F. LIBYA
In January 1986, President Ronald Reagan imposed
sweeping economic sanctions against the government of
Libya. The basis for the sanctions was the purported Lib-
yan involvement in bloody terrorist attacks on several Eu-
ropean airports. 5 6  While the Executive Order
promulgating the sanctions against Libya relied upon nu-
152 In re Suspension of Sales in the U.S. on Syrian Arab Airlines, D.O.T. Order
No. 86-11-30 (Nov. 14, 1986).
I d. at 1-2. Syrian Arab Airlines was not providing any direct service to the
United States at the time.
I" Id.
,51 In re Suspension of Sales in the United States on Syrian Arab Airlines, Final
Order, D.O.T. Order No. 86-12-48 (Nov. 24, 1986).
'" CARTER, supra note 127, at 195.
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merous statutes for authority,' 57 the President's action
was principally based on the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act,' 5 8 commonly known as IEEPA.159
In sum,
[t]hese sanctions include[d] a ban on almost all imports
from Libya and exports to it, a prohibition on any new
loans or other credits to Libya, financial controls that ef-
fectively prohibit most travel to Libya or living there, and
a freeze on all Libyan property interests in the United
States or in the control of any United States person, in-
cluding overseas branches of United States entities.,60
With respect to aviation, President Reagan's Executive
Order specifically precluded:
[a]ny transaction by a United States person relating to
transportation to or from Libya; the provision of transpor-
tation to or from the United States by any Libyan person
or any vessel or aircraft of Libyan registration; or the sale
in the United States by any person holding authority
under the Federal Aviation Act of any transportation by
air which includes any stop in Libya.' 6'
The Executive Order also precluded travel to or from
Libya by any U.S. citizen' 62 and authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury, in conjunction with the Secretary of
State, to develop rules and regulations to effectuate the
President's orders. 163 Regulations concerning travel to
and from Libya were eventually promulgated.' 64
Immediately following the issuance of the President's
Executive Order, the DOT issued a related order to show
157 Exec. Order No. 12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (1986).
'.11 Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, § 202, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-04 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
,59 See CARTER, supra note 127, at 195.
160 Id.
,6, Exec. Order, supra note 157, at 133. This was not the first time that the
United States had imposed restrictions on travel to Libya. In 1981, in response to
a series of international incidents, the United States had restricted use of U.S.
passports to gain entrance into Libya. See Bialos &Juster, supra note 1, at 803-05.
62 Exec. Order, supra note 157, at B3, B4.
1113 Id. at B4.
'4 See 31 C.F.R. § 550.207 (1993).
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cause. The DOT proposed to add several provisions to
all section 402 permits held by foreign carriers and to
those exemptions held by U.S. and foreign carriers, to be
effective February 1, 1986. These provisions precluded
the sale of air transportation within the United States that
included any stop in Libya and barred flights to or from
the United States of any Libyan-registered aircraft.' 65
The DOT additionally proposed to bar any transaction in-
volving transportation to or from Libya. 166 This order
was finalized shortly thereafter. 67
G. SOUTH AFRICA
The U.S.-South African bilateral agreement was signed
in 1947 and provided for service by South African and
U.S.-designated carriers between the two countries. 168
The original bilateral agreement was amended twice to re-
vise route designations, once in 1953 and again in
1968.169 Article IX of the original bilateral agreement
contained an arbitration' 70 clause that stipulated:
Except as otherwise provided in this agreement or its an-
nex, any dispute between the contracting parties relative
to the interpretation or application of this agreement or its
annex, which cannot be settled through consultation, shall
be submitted for an advisory report to a tribunal of three
arbitrators . . . . The executive authorities of the con-
tracting parties will use their best efforts under the powers
available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed
in any such advisory report. ' 7'
165 In re Suspension of Operations Between the U.S. and Libya, D.O.T. Order
No. 86-1-15, at 2 (1986).
166 Id.
167 In re Suspension of Operations Between the U.S. and Libya, D.O.T. Order
No. 86-1-15 (1986).
6 Air Services Agreement, May 23, 1947, U.S.-S. Afr., T.I.A.S. No. 1639.
- Exchange of Notes Between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Ambassador
of the Union of South Africa, July 21 and Nov. 2, 1953, 143 U.N.T.S. 334; Ex-
change of Notes Between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Ambassador of the
Union of South Africa, June 28, 1968, 706 U.N.T.S. 287.
170 143 U.N.T.S. at 504.
171 Id.
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Article XI specifically set forth the procedure for termina-
tion of the bilateral agreement. That article provided that
either party could request consultations to revise the bi-
lateral agreement and that such consultations had to be
commenced within sixty days of the date they were re-
quested. 72 To terminate the agreement, the consulta-
tions contemplated by Article XI had to be initiated. 73
Thereafter, either side could give notice to the other of its
desire to terminate the agreement. 74 Once notice of ter-
mination had been given, the agreement itself would ter-
minate one year hence.175
The first real political battle that South African Airways
(SAA) had to fight in the United States related to its gov-
ernment's apartheid system and came in 1973. At that
time, SAA filed an application with the CAB to amend its
foreign air carrier permit to allow an intermediate stop in
Sal Island and/or Las Palmas. Prior to the application,
SAA had been operating flights between New York and
South Africa via Rio deJaneiro. 76 The amendment to the
bilateral agreement made on June 28, 1968, however, had
provided the right of a South African-designated carrier
to serve the Canary Islands in Spain as an intermediate
stop. 177 Prior to the CAB reviewing SAA's application, a
hearing was held by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to
evaluate the merits of the new routing application. 78 An
assortment of individuals and groups sought, and were
eventually granted, permission to intervene in the pro-
ceedings before the ALJ. 79
Right of intervention was granted to Congressional
members of the American Committee on Africa, the Black
172 Id. at 504-05.
173 Id.
174 Id.
17- Id. at 505.
176 South African Airways Permit Amendment, C.A.B. Order No. 73-102 (Sept.
5, 1973).
177 Exchange of Notes Between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Ambassador
of the Union of South Africa, June 28, 1968, 706 U.N.T.S. 287, 288-89.
17$ C.A.B. Order No. 73-102, supra note 176, at 382.
175 Id.
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United Front of Washington, D.C., the African Heritage
Studies Association, and IFCO-Action.' 8° The interven-
ors contended that the ALJ and the Board were incapable
of determining whether SAA was "fit, willing and able to
perform"' 8 ' the new service because "facts bearing upon
the racially discriminatory visa policies of the South Afri-
can Government and racial segregation of passengers in
foreign air transportation within South Africa are crucial
to the Board's determinations."'' 82 The unwillingness of
the Board to receive evidence related to such issues, ac-
cording to the intervenors, precluded grant of the sought-
after authority.18 3 SAA responded to this argument by
contending that it did not discriminate in any fashion in
providing foreign air transportation. 8 4
The ALJ ultimately felt compelled to award to SAA the
sought-after route authority because the route had been
provided for in the bilateral agreement. 85 He explained:
Any attempts to deal with another government's general
racial or religious practices, as distinguished from discrim-
ination in air transportation, should be the subject of a
single overall United States policy. In the absence of en-
actment by the Congress of an overall Government policy,
only the President can fashion a policy covering not only
the Board but other Government agencies as well.' 8 6
The ALJ further found that there had been no race-based
discrimination against U.S. citizens using SAA or the Jo-
hannesburg airport. 87 Ultimately the CAB proved as re-
luctant to evaluate the policies and procedures employed
by SAA, at least with respect to domestic flights. "The
effect of such examination would be to require the Board
to evaluate the activities of a foreign carrier within its
180 Id.
"1 Id. at 384.
182 Id. at 385.
183 Id.
1114 Id. at 384-85.
15 Id. at 385.
'86 Id. at 386.
187 Id. at 386-87.
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home country and to pass judgment on the internal poli-
cies of a foreign government."'188 SAA's route rights were
amended as requested by the carrier.
Anti-apartheid activists would have to wait until 1985
before Congress began to earnestly debate taking actions
against South Africa because of its racial policies. On the
House side, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Ways and Means Committee, and on the Senate side, the
Banking Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee,
would play leading roles in the shepherding of anti-
apartheid legislation through Congress. Eventually, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.R. 4868,
which included a provision prohibiting the takeoff and
landing in the United States of any aircraft owned by the
South African government or by South African nation-
als.' 8 9 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee released
S. 2701, which included a provision to terminate the U.S./
South African Air Services Agreement. 90
During initial debate in the Senate on S. 2701, Senator
Lugar, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee
that had favorably reported the bill, specifically explained
that the bill was designed to end "landing rights for the
state owned airline ... immediately upon the expiration
of the notice period required by international law under
which these flights take place."'' What Senator Lugar
was referring to was the twelve month termination clause
contained in the bilateral agreement. 92 But other mem-
bers of the Senate were not content with the notion that
landing rights would be denied on such a basis. Senator
Sarbanes, joined by Senator Kassenbaum, offered an
amendment to section 306(a):
(1) The President shall immediately notify the Govern-
ment of South Africa of his intention to suspend the rights
'an Id. at 379.
189 H.R. REP. No. 638, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1986).
, ' S. REP. No. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1986).
132 CONG. REC. 21,471 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
192 Air Services Agreement, supra note 168, at 505.
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of any air carrier designated by the Government of South
Africa under the [bilateral agreement] ....
(2) Ten days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
President shall direct the Secretary of Transportation to
revoke the right of any air carrier designated by the Gov-
ernment of South Africa under the Agreement to provide
service pursuant to the Agreement.' 9f
Senator Sarbanes clearly articulated the purpose of offer-
ing what would later be viewed by some as a poorly
worded amendment:
As the bill is now written, notice has to be given to ter-
minate the current agreement. A year would then have to
elapse before aircraft were actually prohibited from flying
.... When the committee considered immediate sanc-
tions and future sanctions to express our opposition to
apartheid, the termination of air transportation was in-
cluded among those that would be imposed immediately.
The way section 306 has been drafted, it does not ac-
complish this goal. What the provision does, as currently
written, is set in motion the termination of our bilateral air
service agreement .... The amendment that the Senator
from Kansas and I have offered would bring a suspension
of air service 10 days after the enactment of the legisla-
tion. It would have the President notify South Africa[n]
authorities of his intention to suspend and ten days later,
the suspension would take effect....
It is my judgment, after analyzing the agreement and consulting
with legal experts, that the United States is within its rights to sus-
pend air service in the interim without violating provisions of the
agreement, a concern raised by some. I am convinced that it
is perfectly proper for the United States to engage in such
a suspension because the agreement allows such an action
in the event either party has failed to fulfill the terms of
the agreement.
I think it is clear that the government of South Africa
has breached section IV of the annex to the agreement
which has an objective to "foster and encourage the widest
possible distribution of the benefits of air travel for the
193 132 CONG. REC. 21,561 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Sarbanes).
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good of mankind ... and to stimulate international travel
as a means of promoting friendly understanding and
goodwill among peoples." I do not believe anyone can
honestly assert that the South African Government has
permitted all its citizens fully to enjoy the benefits which
the agreement envisioned. As my colleagues will recall,
the South African Government has prohibited Reverend
Boesak, Bishop Tutu, and other leaders in South Africa
from leaving the country from time to time.' 9 4
Senator Pell followed up Senator Sarbanes' statement
and indicated that it was his understanding that the com-
mittee had intended to impose the aviation sanctions im-
mediately, rather than one year hence.' 95 But Senator
Lugar was clearly not happy with the proposed amend-
ment. He explained that the State Department had indi-
cated that:
if we unilaterally suspend, terminate or otherwise interfere
with the [bilateral] agreement, the South African govern-
ment would have a right to take the United States to arbi-
tration as provided in article 9 of this bilateral agreement
.... And if the arbitrators were to find in favor of South
Africa ... we would be obliged to seek an appropriation
from Congress to pay the award.'
96
Senator Sarbanes did not, however, put much credence in
the State Department's position:
[T]he State Department is against sanctions altogether, so
I find it very difficult to place any stock in the Depart-
ment's clearly self serving legal view. The position taken
by the State Department runs directly counter to other ex-
pert opinion, I submit counter to the clear language of the
document. The arbitration procedure set forth in article
IX, to which the Senator refers says at its very outset,
194 Id. at 21,561-62 (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 21,562.
96 Id.; cf Kevin Chamberlain, Collective Suspension of Air Services with States Which
Harbor Hyackers, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 616, 628 (1986) (noting that countries
terminated and denounced air service agreements with Afghanistan in accord with
the denunciation requirements of bilaterals that provided for a one year wind-
down period).
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"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this agreement or its
annex."
"Except as otherwise provided," and Mr. President it is
otherwise provided. There is another section, article VI
which provides that each contracting party reserves the
right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an air
carrier in case of failure to fulfill the conditions under
which the rights are granted in accordance with the agree-
ment and its annex. I quoted earlier from a provision of
the annex with respect to encouraging free travel, and un-
derscored the clear violation of the South African government of
that provision.
What I am saying is that they have violated the agree-
ment - the South African Government has violated the
agreement. In view of that fact, we are entitled to invoke
article VI to carry out the suspension of air travel. The
indication of article VI, with respect to suspension oper-
ates separate and apart from the arbitration provision of
article IX, which clearly states, "except as otherwise pro-
vided in this agreement or its annex."' 9 7
The Sarbanes amendment was eventually added to the
Anti-Apartheid Act, 198 but at the end of September 1986,
President Reagan vetoed that act.199 The veto was even-
tually overridden by the House and Senate, and the act
became law. °°
The United States was not alone in its imposition of
sanctions against the South African government. Other
countries moved against South Africa in the tourism and
aviation areas. For example, Great Britain passed legisla-
tion calling for a voluntary end to promotion of tourism
to South Africa.2 0 ' The Commonwealth of Nations took
even more dramatic steps. Like the United States, the
Commonwealth ultimately banned airlinks with South Af-
rica. Additionally, the Commonwealth precluded South
Africans from obtaining visas in its consulates and banned
197 Statement of Sen. Sarbanes, supra note 193, at 21,563 (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 21,564.
19 132 CONG. REC. 27,076 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986).
2- Id. at 27,101.
201 Id. at 27,089-90.
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the promotion of South African tourism in the Common-
wealth. °2 Japan suspended airlinks with South Africa and
precluded Japanese government officials from using the
services of South African Airways. Japan also suspended
the issuance of tourist visas for South Africans and re-
quested its citizens to refrain from traveling to South
Africa. 3
Following the override of his veto of the Anti-Apartheid
Act, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12571,
which set forth the duties of the various departments of
the Executive Branch with respect to implementation of
the Act.2°4 Not surprisingly, the DOT was assigned the
responsibility of implementing the provisions of section
306 dealing with suspension of air service between the
two countries.0 5 The day after the President issued his
Executive Order, the DOT issued a show cause order in
which it proposed to revoke the section 402 permit of
SAA. °6 SAA launched a full fledged attack in response to
the show cause proceeding in an effort both to forestall
the inevitable and to preserve its record for subsequent
legal action.
SAA made several different arguments before the DOT
in the show cause proceeding. First, SAA argued that its
rights to serve the United States could not be abridged
prior to termination of the bilateral agreement and that
the agreement could only be terminated after the one year
notice of termination period had run.2°7 The DOT re-
jected this contention, finding that "Congress could not
have intended that we wait until after the agreement had
been terminated because, by that time, there would be no
existing agreement under which a South African carrier
202 Id.
203 Id.
2- Exec. Order No. 12,571, 51 Fed. Reg. 209 (1986).
20. Id. at 39,505.
2 6 In re Termination of Air Carrier Operations Between the United States and
South Africa, D.O.T. Order No. 86-13-60 (1986).
27 In re Termination of Air Carrier Operations Between the United States and
South Africa, D.O.T. Order No. 86-11-29 (1986).
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would be designated or have rights. 208
Second, SAA contended that immediate revocation of
its operating rights was not required by the language of
the Anti-Apartheid Act. The DOT dismissed this conten-
tion as well, pointing to the ten day period Congress had
included in the legislation, during which time the Presi-
dent was to direct the Secretary of Transportation to take
those actions contemplated by the Anti-Apartheid Act.2°9
"Had it expected DOT to wait the year that it takes to
terminate the Agreement, there would have been no point
in instructing the President to direct the Secretary in ten
days."210
Third, SAA argued that the aviation sanctions con-
tained in the Anti-Apartheid Act conflicted with section
1102(a) of the Federal Aviation Act, which required the
Secretary of Transportation to act "consistently with any
agreement in force between the United States and an-
other country. 2 1 1 The DOT responded by suggesting
that the more specific statutory language of the Anti-
Apartheid Act governed over the more general language
of the referenced section of the Federal Aviation Act.
Finally, SAA asserted that the revocation of its operat-
ing permit would constitute a breach of the treaty be-
tween the United States and South Africa.2 " The DOT
rejected this argument on the grounds that the President
had "sufficient authority to take actions which may be
contrary to Executive Agreements. Similarly, it is estab-
lished that Congress may act in a manner that is inconsis-
tent with Executive Agreements. 214  The DOT
purportedly found support for these concepts in two




211 Id. at 4.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 4-5.
2'4 Id. at 5.
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water v. Carter. 5 The citation to Goldwater v. Carter was
simply improper given that the opinion in that case had
been vacated by the United States Supreme Court.216
Finally, SAA contended that the show cause order,
which afforded it two days notice prior to hearing, denied
it due process rights. The revocation of its permit, SAA
argued coming so quickly after issuance of a final order by
the DOT, did not provide it sufficient time to end its U.S.
operations.2 1' The DOT, not surprisingly, was unim-
pressed with these arguments and rejected them as
well.21 In fact, there is no evidence that the DOT gave
any thought to what would predictably be enormous fi-
nancial losses resulting from such a rapid service cutoff,
not to mention the many U.S. employees whose jobs
would be terminated and the passengers whose travel
would be disrupted. Having dispensed with SAA's objec-
tions, the DOT then proceeded to revoke SAA's operat-
ing permit and conditioned the operating authority of
U.S. carriers to preclude service to South Africa.2 1 9
Not content with the drubbing it had taken at the hands
of the DOT, SAA filed a petition for review with the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. 2 In its petition, SAA argued that the immediate rev-
ocation of its landing permit was barred by the bilateral
agreement. SAA also contended that the order for imme-
diate revocation was not mandated by the terms of the
Anti-Apartheid Act and that the order violated provisions
of the Federal Aviation Act, which required that the Sec-
retary of Transportation construe statutes and executive
agreements in conjunction with outstanding international
treaties "so as to give effect to both."2 2 ' The court ulti-
215 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
216 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
2 ,7 D.O.T. Order No. 86-11-29, supra note 207, at 5.
211 Id. at 5-6.
219 Id. at 6.
220 South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 896 (1989).
221 Id. at 121.
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mately held against SAA.22 2
SAA's first principal argument before the court was that
section 306(a)(2) was unclear as to when the Secretary
could revoke SAA's landing permit. As a result, the Sec-
retary could have timed the actual suspension of the per-
mit "to coincide with the termination of the
Agreement. 2 2 3 The court rejected this analysis:
Subsection 306(a)(1) required the President to "immedi-
ately notify" the South African government of his intention
to suspend such service, and subsection 306(a)(2) called
for him to direct the Secretary ten days later to revoke the
right of any carrier designated by the government of
South Africa to provide air service pursuant to the
Agreement. 224
In short, the court found that the clear intention of Con-
gress was to see SAA's permit revoked in the most expedi-
tious manner possible.22 5
SAA's second principal argument was that section 306
had to be interpreted consistently with the bilateral agree-
ment so as not to "require the United States to violate its
obligations under an executive agreement. 2 2 6 The court
rejected this contention as well. First, the court suggested
that there was nothing in the legislative history to indicate
that Congress intended to violate the bilateral agree-
ment. 7 The court then explained that even if the effect
of the congressional action was to violate the treaty, it was
not for the court to make such a determination in the case
at bar. 8 But then the court went on to assume arguendo
that in fact the relevant section of the Anti-Apartheid Act
did contravene the terms of the bilateral agreement.229
The court explained that, under these circumstances, a re-
222 Id.
222 Id. at 124.
224 Id. (emphasis added).
225 Id.
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peal by implication might be found.2 30 Here, the court ex-
plained, congressional intent was unambiguous.
Therefore, if there was a contradiction between the stat-
ute and the bilateral agreement, the statute would
prevail.231
Finally, the court found that the generalized mandate of
section 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act2 32 was super-
seded by the specific language of the Anti-Apartheid Act.
The language, explained the court, directed the Secretary
of Transportation to take actions that, at the very least,
were inconsistent with the bilateral agreement.2 33
II. THE PROPRIETY OF U.S. ACTIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
As should be evident from the discussion above, legal
analysis of United States' use of treaty bending, treaty
breaking, and economic sanctions in international avia-
tion by necessity involves facts and behavior that are by
no means consistent. In the case of South Africa, for ex-
ample, the United States was faced with the frustration of
a trading partner's bilateral aviation rights. On the other
hand, U.S. action against Aeroflot, relating to the Soviet
Union's purported complicity in imposition of martial law
in Poland, did not raise a treaty breach question, as Aer-
oflot's ability to serve the United States was based only on
comity and reciprocity.
Yet another category of U.S. action came as a result of
alleged violations by other countries of multilateral con-
ventions and customary international law. The sanctions
imposed on Syria, which had no existing bilateral aviation
relationship with or airline service to the United States,
fall into this category. Each of the factually disparate in-
stances where the United States took action against an-
2,0 Id. at 125-26.
2.1 Id. at 126.
212 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502(a) (1988).
2.1.1 South African Airways, 817 F.2d at 127.
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other country in the aviation sector should be evaluated
to determine propriety under international law.
A. SYRIA, LIBYA AND LEBANON
The attempt to place a bomb on a civilian airliner by a
Syrian did not directly harm U.S. interests. The action oc-
curred in Great Britain, and the target was an airline of
another country. Undoubtedly, there were Americans
aboard the aircraft, but none were actually harmed. Nev-
ertheless, assuming Syrian complicity in the attempted
bombing - of which there was little doubt given the
Hindawi confession - that country was in gross violation
of various multilateral conventions and customary inter-
national law.
The limited U.S. response to this incident reflected the
fact that Syria was not an active aviation trading partner
with the United States. The sanctions were vertically con-
sistent in that the alleged Syrian affront in the aviation
sector was met with sanctions in that sector. Indeed, the
U.S. response would fall into the category of a "third state
remedy" in international law.23 4 Under some modern
theories of international law, a consensus exists that non-
injured States can take limited actions against harm per-
petrators to discourage violations of international law.23 5
For example, in the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, U.S.
vessels took hostile actions against belligerents found
mining international waters, even though no U.S. vessels
were actually harmed.236 And while the Vienna Conven-
tion's article 60 purports to govern breaches by States of
multilateral treaties, the Convention itself does not, as
one commentator noted, preclude an "independent right
under customary international law" to undertake reprisals
for breach of a multilateral. 37
2- See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10
MICH J. INT'L L. 57 (1989).
2I5 ld. at 59. Charney points out that third state enforcement of international
law should not be punitive but corrective in nature. Id. at 87.
236 Id. at 58.
237 Id. at 64.
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To be sure, there are risks to the employment of third
state remedies. Perhaps the biggest is that natural adver-
saries will use third state remedies as a way to harm oppo-
nents.238 In addition, if different States employ different
types of sanctions against an offending State, ultimate res-
olution of the dispute may be difficult. The disparate de-
mands of those employing sanctions against the offender
could make settlement unwieldy.2 3 9 This concern sug-
gests that resorting to a collective decision maker, to-
gether with the imposition of uniform, multilateral
sanctions, is preferable. 240 The reality of geopolitics and
the inherent limitations of the international legal regime,
however, mean that in many instances there is little hope
of imposing multilateral sanctions against an offending
State.24 '
In the case of Hindawi, the U.S. actions were proper
given the nature of Syria's affront to the international
legal regime. Under established principles of nationality
and territorial jurisdiction, the United States had the right
to preclude the sale of tickets on Syrian Arab Airlines
within the United States. This right prevailed even absent
Syria's complicity in the Hindawi affair. The fact that Syr-
ian Arab Airlines was a government-owned carrier and
had itself been used to shepherd Hindawi into the United
Kingdom lends further legitimacy to the U.S. response.
Moreover, the employment of an aviation-related sanction
to meet an aviation-related violation of international law
gives the appearance of balance and equity.
The context of U.S. imposition of sanctions against
Libya in certain ways parallels actions taken against Syria.
At the time of the Libyan terrorist attacks on the Rome
and Vienna airports, there was no extant United States-
238 Id. at 87.
2.9 Id. at 90.
240 Id. at 97.
241 Id. at 63-64, 92-93. One of the problems with multilateral sanctions is
whether any institution has the will and authority to impose them. Based upon
the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Security Council should impose sanctions only in an
effort to maintain international peace and security.
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Libyan bilateral agreement and no passenger air service
between the two countries. No U.S. interests were di-
rectly harmed in the attack, but nevertheless, the potential
threat to U.S. travellers and air carriers was perceived as
quite real. Moreover, there was the threat of serious eco-
nomic harm to U.S. air carriers as passengers canceled or
postponed plans to visit Europe by the thousands. Unlike
the Hindawi episode, the terrorists succeeded in their
bloody attacks on the European airports. The United
States, based upon intelligence analysis, determined that
the attacks could not have been carried out without the
support of Libya's leader Qaddafi 4 2 To the extent that
Libya did indeed promote these attacks, it did so in viola-
tion of the U.N. Charter, various aviation multilaterals,
and customary international law. 43
The U.S. response to Libya, exercised as a third state
remedy, was, not surprisingly, broader and harsher than
with Syria. Invocation of IEEPA by President Reagan
gave the Executive "practically unlimited" domestic
power to impose harsh economic sanctions.244 As a re-
sult, the Treasury Department was able to issue sweeping
regulations prohibiting virtually all trade with that coun-
try.245 The significance of the President's use of the
IEEPA umbrella was that he was "characteriz[ing] state-
sponsored terrorism as a national emergency. ' 246 Previ-
ously, both the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and
IEEPA were employed to impose trade sanctions against
Cuba. 4 7 There, however, U.S. citizens had been prohib-
ited from traveling to Cuba under the Passport Act of
1926.48
242 Bialos & Juster, supra note 1, at 839-55.
243 KevinJ. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law
Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461, 470-71 (1992).
244 John P. Giraudo, Waging Economic Warfare: The Sanction Powers Under the Consti-
tution, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 935 (1987).
245 Bialos & Juster, supra note 1, at 838.
246 Id. at 811.
247 Leonard B. Boudin, Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 803 (1987).
248 Id. at 803-04.
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The imposition of broad travel-related sanctions
against the Libyans was appropriate under international
law. There was a vertical consistency with the harm per-
petrated. The United States, as with sanctions employed
against Syria, could rely upon territorial and nationality
jurisdiction to support its actions. It violated no treaties
or agreements by imposing the travel and aviation-related
sanctions.2 49 To the contrary, such sanctions can be
viewed as promoting the principles of aviation safety ar-
ticulated in the Chicago Convention.
The implications of U.S. actions against Lebanon dif-
fered from those taken against Syria and Libya because of
the existence of a bilateral agreement governing service
between the two countries. The United States effectively
suspended that agreement - not based upon any Leba-
nese failure to honor its obligations under its terms but
rather - based upon Lebanon's failure to adhere to the
requirements of a multilateral convention. To be sure,
the sanctions employed by the United States were verti-
cally consistent and purported to be corrective rather
than punitive. But while few would dispute that Lebanon
violated its legal obligations under a multilateral treaty, the
more difficult issue is whether the U.S. response - sus-
pending operation of the bilateral agreement and impos-
ing other aviation related sanctions - also constituted a
violation of international law.
Was the United States liable for breach of treaty? The
answer is not clear. The United States could argue that a
mere suspension of operating rights did not amount to a
breach of treaty. If a court or arbitration panel deter-
mined that the U.S. actions had amounted to a breach, the
United States might have argued, in the alternative, that
its actions were justified based upon article 62 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Conven-
tion). Invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the
United States could suggest that a fundamental change of
241 See Cooke, supra note 1, at 195 (describing the Libyan travel related bans and
a case that tested the legality of those constraints).
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circumstances had occurred following the signing of the
bilateral agreement that justified United States treaty sus-
pension. While the United States is not a signatory to the
Vienna Convention, it has acknowledged that the conven-
tion represents customary international law with respect
to treaty obligations.2 50 Article 62 of the Vienna Conven-
tion provides:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has oc-
curred with regard to those existing at the time of the con-
clusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be
bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the
extent of obligations still to be performed under the
treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from
a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is a result of a breach by
the party invoking it either of an obligation under
the treaty or any other international obligation
owed to any other party to the treaty.25'
Clearly no one foresaw that Lebanon would be a partici-
pant in the coddling of hijackers at the time that the bilat-
eral agreement was signed. Presumably, had the United
States known that, it would not have entered into a bilat-
eral aviation relationship with the Lebanese. But was the
hijacking issue of such paramount importance as to con-
stitute an "essential basis of the consent of the
parties" ?252
2- BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1991).
25, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties § 62 (1969), reprinted in
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To satisfy the requirements of article (62)(a)(1), the
United States would have to prove that it operated under
the assumption that Lebanon would prosecute hijackers
or extradite them. Furthermore, the United States would
also have to show that Lebanon's refusal to prosecute or
extradite was an act that constituted a "radical change"
under article 62(1)(b) such as to "transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.12 3 The
United States could argue that the radical change was rep-
resented by a new safety threat to service between the two
countries, namely, that hijackers, knowing of Lebanon's
reluctance to take action against its brethren, would target
airlines serving the country from the United States. The
problem with this argument is that virtually no Americans
were traveling to Lebanon. Indeed, at the time, the Leba-
nese carrier (MEA) was not even serving the United States
with passenger flights. A hijacking threat to the lone
cargo carrier actually flying between the two countries
(TMA) was improbable. So at least under article 62 terms
of the Vienna Convention, the United States would not be
on firm ground in suspending the bilateral agreement.
This analysis, however, leaves a number of questions
unanswered. For example, could the United States justify
the termination or suspension of its bilateral agreement
treaty obligations with Lebanon on the basis of that coun-
try's violation of a multilateral convention? Or would the
U.S. response to such a violation have to conform to the
dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in the multilat-
eral itself? The Vienna Convention does not squarely ad-
dress this issue. At least one commentator has suggested
that violations of the Hague Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft are to be anticipated:
"States which are parties to the relevant convention may,
when faced with an actual incident, choose for various
reasons not to honor their obligations. Violations are to




ensuring compliance, in spite of arbitration provisions in
the Convention." '25 4 This commentator also suggests that
"any state which permits its territory to become a safe ha-
ven for hijackers creates a severe threat to the safety of
international civil aviation and consequently is in funda-
mental breach of its obligations under the Chicago Con-
vention. ' 255 Such a scenario would justify suspension of a
bilateral agreement with the offending country.256
In sum, the United States would be hard-pressed to
prevail in any claim of changed circumstances under the
Vienna Convention. It would, however, seemingly have a
stronger position in contending that Lebanon's violation
of a multilateral aviation treaty, designed to deter harm to
innocent passengers from terrorist attacks, mandated that
the United States exercise a protective function in prohib-
iting United States travel to Lebanon in any form.
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR
United States actions' taken during the late 1970s and
early 1980s against Eastern bloc countries must be evalu-
ated in the context of the Cold War era. Nevertheless, in
developing aviation relationships with Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and the USSR, the United States assumed certain
obligations under international law. These obligations
were not always met in a manner that satisfied these trad-
ing partners or applicable principles of international law.
The United States ordered the closing of CSA's New
York ticket office arose out of a dispute under the bilateral
agreement, specifically, the inability of the U.S.-desig-
nated carrier, contrary to prior agreements, to accept
Czech crowns as payment for travel and convert those
crowns into dollars in Czechoslovakia. The retaliatory ac-
2,1 Chamberlain, supra note 196, at 615.
,-5 Id. at 631.
2-.6 Id. U.S. law allows the President to suspend air transport rights of another
country where it has been determined that the aviation trading partner has vio-
lated the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 49
U.S.C. app. § 1514 (1988). Such a provision under domestic law does not in and
of itself legitimate such an action under international law.
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tion taken by the United States against CSA does not fit
squarely into any of the legal frameworks outlined above.
The bilateral agreement itself provided for the sale of
tickets on a reciprocal basis. The Czechs, however, were
not in a position to implement that portion of the bilateral
agreement at the time it was signed. All parties to the
agreement knew of the Czech position. What was unclear
was what kind of position the Czechs would be in approxi-
mately two years later.
The Czechs ultimately contended that the U.S. carrier
was afforded most favored nation treatment and that in-
ternational law did not require anything other than that.
But this argument would fall flat from the United States'
perspective because one of the purposes of entering into
a bilateral agreement is to be afforded better than most
favored nation treatment - that is, to obtain national
treatment. The United States could also legitimately ar-
gue that CSA was foolhardy to invest large sums of money
into a New York ticket office, given its government's re-
fusal to allow Pan Am to sell its tickets within Czechoslo-
vakia for convertible crowns. CSA, then a State-owned
airline, should perhaps have anticipated some form of re-
taliatory action by the United States.
Without knowing the negotiating history of this particu-
lar provision, it is difficult to evaluate the propriety of U.S.
action under international law. For example, if the United
States was aware that despite the language of the bilateral
agreement the Czechs might well not be able at any proxi-
mate time to allow ticket sales by Pan Am in local cur-
rency, then the U.S. action against the CSA New York
ticket office would appear precipitous, unfair, and legally
questionable. The impression of unfairness is reinforced
by the fact that the United States permitted both LOT and
Aeroflot to sell their own tickets in the United States de-
spite the fact that Pan Am could not sell its tickets for lo-
cal currency convertible in either Poland or the USSR. Of
course, the Czechs could have attempted invocation of the
arbitration clause of the bilateral agreement following re-
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ceipt of the order by the United States to close the New
York ticket office. That action, however, could ultimately
have moved the United States to the point where further
extensions of the bilateral agreement would have been
precluded.
The decision by the United States to order the closing
of CSA's Chicago ticket office as a result of a diplomatic
dispute unrelated to aviation presents a different type of
situation. The U.S. response to the diplomatic affront was
not vertically consistent because the precipitating dispute
had nothing to do with the then existing bilateral aviation
relationship between the two countries. Indeed, the ac-
tion represented a case of retortion. The United States
was not necessarily disgruntled over any violation of inter-
national law by the Czechs, let alone a violation of the avi-
ation bilateral agreement. Rather, the United States was
responding to an affront to one of its citizens, a member
of its diplomatic community.
The Czech position here would likely be that this diplo-
matic flap had absolutely nothing to do with the operation
of the country's international airline, much less whether
that airline could continue to maintain a ticket office in
Chicago, established under the auspices of a commercial
treaty. But retortion by its very nature does not mandate
a tit-for-tat response by the offended country. To the
contrary, it is deemed to be more effective to the extent
that the response is unpredictable and unforeseeable.
CSA's argument would be stronger had it not been a
State-owned carrier at the time. The fact that it was the
embodiment of the Czechoslovak State lends some sup-
port to the U.S. actions - notwithstanding the total ab-
sence of any relationship. As was the case with the closing
of the CSA New York ticket office, the Czechs could have
sought arbitration - and undoubtedly jeopardized future
extensions of the bilateral agreement.
The U.S. decision to order Aeroflot to reduce service to
the United States in 1980 came after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. At that time, no bilateral agreement gov-
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erning service existed, and Aeroflot was only flying to the
United States under principles of reciprocity and comity.
Moreover, while no U.S. interests were directly
threatened by the Soviet invasion, the attack on Afghani-
stan represented a clear violation of the U.N. Charter and
customary international law. Reduction in Aeroflot's air
service to the United States and closer regulation of its
charter activity were two of several retaliatory economic
sanctions used by the United States against the Soviets at
the time.
The aviation sanctions initiated against Aeroflot were
not vertically consistent because the Soviet attack on Af-
ghanistan was unrelated to the aviation sector. Once
again, the United States was exercising a third state rem-
edy under international law and using the aviation sector
as the arrow for the bow. Since no bilateral agreement
governed service at the time, the Soviets could not claim
any violation of international law by the United States. As
one commentator noted, article 41 of the U.N. Charter
does not preclude "States either individually or collec-
tively . . . from taking steps to interrupt air communica-
tion with a particular State . . . provided that the action
they take is consistent with their other obligations under
the Charter and under international law. ' 25 7
The decision to take further action against Aeroflot,
prompted by alleged Soviet complicity in the imposition
of martial law in Poland, was likewise taken at a time when
no bilateral air service provisions between the two coun-
tries were operable. No U.S. interests were directly
threatened by the alleged Soviet activity. Moreover, de-
spite President Reagan's claim that the Soviets bore
"heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Po-
land, 258 it is not at all clear that the Soviets were guilty of
any international law violations. The U.S. response of ter-
minating Aeroflot's landing rights did not on its face con-
257 Chamberlain, supra note 196, at 629.
2.18 Bialos &Juster, supra note 1, at 67.
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stitute a violation of international law 2 5 9 but was once
again an example of the use of a vertically inconsistent
economic sanction designed to achieve certain foreign
policy objectives.26 °
Reaffirmance and expansion of sanctions against Aer-
oflot came following the shoot-down of Korean Airline
Flight 007. Of the 269 persons who died over the Sea of
Japan, 2 6 a number were U.S. nationals. While the South
Koreans clearly had the most to complain about, the
United States, unlike in the cases of Soviet moves in Af-
ghanistan and actions related to Poland, was directly
harmed by this unprecedented action. The USSR, a party
to numerous multilateral treaties governing aviation navi-
gation and safety, was widely condemned by the world
community for a gross violation of international law. Use
of retortion 262 by the United States in imposing vertically
consistent additional sanctions against the Soviet's airline
seemed entirely appropriate from a legal perspective.
C. POLAND
The more legally troubling instances of U.S. use of eco-
21 But see Paul A. Shneyer & Virginia Barta, The Legality of the U.S. Economic Block-
ade of Cuba Under International Law, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 451, 471 (1981)
(noting that "there are numerous U.N. resolutions which indicate that the major-
ity of nations consider the use of economic coercion illegal"). Indeed, there have
been efforts within the U.N. to characterize economically coercive behavior as a
violation of article 2(1) of the Charter. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter does, how-
ever, permit States to cut off air service to a country in conjunction with imposi-
tion of U.N. sanctions "provided that the action they take is consistent with their
other obligations under the Charter and under international law." Chamberlain,
supra note 196, at 629.
260 Some observers suggest that one of the greatest advantages of the use of
economic sanctions is the avoidance of armed conflict. See Moyer & Mabry, supra
note 1, at 157; Bialos &Juster, supra note 1, at 847. Unfortunately, the U.S. has
not attained the level of executive interdepartmental coordination of economic
sanctions that attends military actions. See Robert Carswell, The Need for Planning
and Coordination of Economic Sanctions, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 857, 860-61
(1987); Bialos &Juster, supra note 1, at 847.
26, Tracy A. Thomas, Note, 007 - Licensed to Limit Without Notice: The Case of
Chan v. Korea Airlines, Inc., 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 95, 95 (1990).
262 For a discussion of the concept of retortion, see ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRAT-
EGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 257 (1975). Charney notes that the use of retortion
is limited by international law. See Charney, supra note 234, at 59-60.
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nomic sanctions, treaty bending, and treaty breaking ap-
pear in the cases of Poland and South Africa. With
respect to Poland, service to the United States was actively
being conducted by LOT under the terms of the United
States-Polish bilateral agreement. Imposition of martial
law in Poland did not threaten any U.S. interests directly
and was, in and of itself, not a clear violation of interna-
tional law. To the contrary, it was at least facially an inter-
nal Polish matter.26 3 The United States accepted, and in
some cases, supported other non-Soviet aligned regimes
ruling in a similar manner. The response of the United
States to imposition of martial law effectively eviscerated
the terms of the bilateral agreement. The limited circum-
stances under which revocation of LOT's operating per-
mit might be permissible under the agreement were
certainly not met. The U.S. response, moreover, was ver-
tically inconsistent with the harm allegedly being caused
by the Polish government. Was the President's action a
violation of international law?
The United States-Polish bilateral agreement was a
treaty.26  Under the Vienna Convention " 'treaty' is a ge-
neric term embracing any international agreement con-
cluded between states in writing. ' 26 5 Since the United
States views the Vienna Convention as a "primary source
of reference for determining ... customary principles of
treaty law, ' 26 6 it is at least a place to begin the analysis.2 67
263 As Charney notes, States are generally prohibited from interfering with the
internal affairs of other States. Charney, supra note 234, at 60. This general pro-
scription has, of course, been eroded, particularly in the human rights area. See
Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and Inter-
national Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1135 (1985).
264 A treaty represents more than a contract because it "is practically the only
device that the international community has at its disposal for conscious lawmak-
ing and for deliberate establishment of legal relationships." Maria Frankowska,
The Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L
L. 281, 288 (1988).
265 Id. at 297.
26 Id. at 298.
267 There is some sentiment that U.S. courts have simply applied all aspects of
the Vienna Convention as customary international law without "any discussion of
whether the specific provisions accurately reflect customary law." Id. at 287.
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Here the question is whether the United States violated a
material term of the treaty and was consequently in
breach. The answer is yes. The United States violated at
least two material terms of the bilateral agreement. First,
it suspended LOT's operating permit for reasons not con-
templated by the agreement. Second, it failed to give the
Polish carrier the requisite one year notice prior to termi-
nation of operating rights.
To be sure, the United States would undoubtedly con-
tend that because it did not terminate the bilateral agree-
ment, it had no duty to provide the one year notice of
termination. Such a position is untenable given one of
the major purposes of the one year notice provision,
namely, to afford an air carrier adequate time to wind up
its affairs. Nor is the United States' position acceptable
under the Vienna Convention's mandate that requires
treaty performance in "good faith." The distinction be-
tween denouncing the bilateral agreement and sus-
pending the operating rights granted thereunder is one
without a difference. The main purpose of an aviation bi-
lateral agreement is to reciprocally exchange operating
rights. 68 U.S. violation of international law in this case
raises some additional (although now largely academic)
issues.
Although the focus of this article is the legitimacy of the
United States imposition of aviation sanctions from an in-
ternational legal perspective, at least some discussion of
the propriety of the President's actions against Poland
under U.S. domestic law is appropriate given their ques-
tionable nature. Does the President, under domestic law,
have the right acting alone to violate international law?
This question brings us into a multi-dimensional debate
that rages today in scholarly and political circles. Courts
268 As LOT's counsel points out, President Reagan could have simply announced
that the soon-to-expire bilateral agreement would not be extended. Such a posi-
tion would have achieved virtually the same practical effect without placing the
United States in violation of international law. Interview with Robert Reed Gray,
supra note 87.
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have held that under certain circumstances, Congress to-
gether with the Executive can violate international law.26
It is far less clear, however, that the Executive acting
alone can do so. 2 70
Those who suggest that the Executive alone cannot
sanction violations of international law by the United
States, will typically rely in part on the original intent of
the founders that the "government's power was [to be]
limited by treaties and by fundamental principles of inter-
national law."' 27' Commentators also rely upon the text of
the Constitution, including Article I, to support the no-
tion that the Executive is duty bound to respect interna-
tional law. Specifically, the Article I duty of the President
to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" has
been interpreted to encompass treaties and international
law. 27 2
A separate but related debate in the scholarly literature
concerns the role of the Executive and the two branches
of Congress in the creation and termination of treaties
and other international agreements - specifically, execu-
tive agreements. 73 Executive agreements "have essen-
269 Lobel, supra note 263, at 1972 n.7 .
270 Id. at 1121 ("The premise - that there is a unilateral executive power to
terminate treaties - is far from established.").
271 Id. at 1077.
272 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1992); see also
Lobel, supra note 263, at 1125 (contending that the President's duty to uphold the
laws is violated when the Executive causes a breach of treaty). Professor Lobel is
emphatic about this obligation and he argues that violation of international law by
the executive "should be presumptively invalid." Id. at 1115. Kenneth Randall
identifies the related debate concerning interpretation of Article VI of the Consti-
tution; some contend that because treaties are therein treated as the law of the
land, they can only be terminated in the same way as other laws. Kenneth C.
Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089, 1109-10 (1990). Others construe
Article VI as merely addressing the superiority of federal over state law.
273 This debate is likewise multi-dimensional. It includes the issue of whether
executive agreements are legitimate as a method for concluding international
agreements and, if so, under what circumstances. The debate also encompasses
the respective roles of Congress and the Executive in particular substantive areas
of law-making. For example, the division of constitutional power to regulate trade
is, contends Professor Koh, ambiguous. Harold H. Koh, Congressional Controls on
Presidential Trade Policymaking, After I.N.S. v. Chada, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1191, 1192 (1986). The Executive claims the power under the rubric of United
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tially the same status under both international and
domestic law as treaties. 274 Unlike treaties, however, ex-
ecutive agreements are not required to be approved by
two-thirds of the Senate. The use of executive agree-
ments has greatly expanded over the past century to the
point where they represent the dominant form of interna-
tional agreement for the United States.275 There are at
least two types of executive agreements: Presidential ex-
ecutive agreements - purportedly made solely by the Ex-
ecutive based upon its own constitutionally enumerated
foreign affairs power 27 6 - and Congressional-executive
agreements, made by the Executive based upon congres-
sional delegation of authority.2 77
The Polish bilateral agreement was concluded as an ex-
ecutive agreement. Most commentators would agree that
the power to conclude an international aviation agreement
implicates the congressional power to regulate foreign
commerce. 278 It seems reasonable to conclude then that
the United States-Polish bilateral agreement has as its do-
States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), while Congress claims the power
under art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 of the Constitution. Trade agreements have been ap-
proved through Senate assent and Presidential ratification as well as through the
less formal Congressional-Executive agreement format. Koh, supra, at 1201.
274 David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of
Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1391 n.157 (1989).
275 Jack S. Weiss, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1532, 1554-55 (1991).
276 The creation of presidential executive agreements has been sanctioned
under circumstances where the subject matter of the agreement falls exclusively
within the constitutional power of the Executive. See United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 228-29 (1942) (stating that the power to conclude a presidential-execu-
tive agreement will be upheld by the courts where incident to recognition of an-
other country); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
U.S. § 303 (1987); Randall, supra note 272, at 1092; Weiss, supra note 275, at
1546.
277 Congress has, for example, delegated much of its Article I power to regulate
commerce to the Executive. United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560,
571 (C.C.P.A. 1975); see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 1659 (1981)
(suggesting that the President alone can conclude international agreements other
than as treaties where he shares constitutional authority with the Congress and
Congress demonstrates support for executive actions); Weiss, supra note 275, at
1548. But see Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 572 (stating that no undelegated power to regu-
late commerce rests with the President).
278 Cf Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Adams, 87 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C. 1950)
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mestic legal foundation a delegation of the foreign com-
merce power to the Executive,279 thereby making it a form
of congressional-executive agreement.
This brings us to the ultimate question with respect to
U.S. domestic law and the Polish bilateral agreement:
Can the President, acting alone, put the United States in
breach of international legal obligations initially created
as a congressional-executive agreement and "upset the legiti-
mate expectations of the many parties who had arranged
their business, commercial, or other affairs based upon
certain assumptions that are subsequently undermined by
• . .Presidential action?1 280
The major stumbling block in answering this question
appears to be the silence of the United States Constitution
with respect to treaty termination, interpretation, and re-
interpretation l.2 8  The practical reality is that the United
States government has used a variety of methods to termi-
nate treaties since the founding of the republic.28 2
Whether those methods were legally proper is, of course,
another question.
At least one scholar suggests a topical approach to the
issue. He contends that where Article II gives the Execu-
tive exclusive authority over a particular topic, the Presi-
dent can make and break treaties and international
agreements at will. Where, on the other hand, Article I
(holding that the power of the CAB to issue permits to foreign air carriers has
been delegated to it by the Executive and Congress under the commerce power).
2179 The delegation of such authority is implicit in several statutes concerning
aviation. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. app. § 1462 (1988) (requiring the Secretary of State
to consult with other Executive departments "concerning the negotiations of any
agreement with foreign governments for the establishment or development of...
air routes and services"). The delegation is explicit in other statutes. See, e.g., 49
U.S.C. app. § 1443 (1988) (stating that all aspects of issuance of foreign carrier air
permits subject to Presidential approval).
280 Christine Chinkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the U.S. President and the Iranian
Hostages Agreement: Dames and Moore v. Regan, 32 Irr'L & COMP. L.Q. 600, 600
(1983).
28, Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1511, 1511 (1989).
282 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706 n.18, 715 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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gives Congress authority or where Articles I and II give
both the Congress and Executive authority, then the Con-
gress must be involved in the termination or reinterpreta-
tion decision making process.28 3  Congressional
supremacists by and large reject such an approach, argu-
ing, for example, that "[b]reaches of treaties for reasons
not permitted under international law nor contemplated
by the parties... are.., presumptively suspect, and con-
gressional approval is necessary to render the conduct
lawful."2 8 4
Here, however, Congressional intentions with respect
to U.S. duties under aviation bilateral agreements were
seemingly clear at the time of the controversy with Po-
land. Section 1502 was enacted to preclude the CAB and
later the DOT from violating international aviation
agreements:
In exercising and performing their powers and duties
under this chapter, the Board and the Secretary of Trans-
portation shall do so consistently with any obligation as-
sumed by the United States in any treaty, convention, or
agreement that may be in force between the United States
and any foreign country or foreign countries ....
In view of the Congressional mandate to the Executive to
honor U.S. international aviation commitments, the uni-
lateral decision by the Executive to suspend operation of
28- See generally Randall, supra note 272, at 1097. While the basis for Congres-
sional power to occupy the field of international aviation may be found at least in
part in the power to regulate foreign commerce, Executive power in this area is
not so clear. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 272, at 70 (stating that the commerce
power "might be sufficient to support virtually any legislation that relates to for-
eign intercourse"). At least one court has suggested that one basis for apparent
Presidential authority is derived from the Commander-in-Chief power. Specifi-
cally, Presidential deference is appropriate in the issuance of foreign air carrier
permits on the basis of his access to confidential intelligence information not
available to others. Trans World Airlines v. Civil Aviation Bd., 184 F.2d 66, 70
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 941 (1951).
284 Lobel, supra note 263, at 1128 n.286, 1130. Lobel contends that Congres-
sional silence should be interpreted by the Executive to mean that the Congress
desires the Executive to observe international law. Id. at 1120; cf Giraudo, supra
note 244, at 939 (noting that congressional power to regulate foreign commerce
extends to the power to impose economic sanctions).
283 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502(a) (1988).
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Poland's air service to the United States was highly sus-
pect under domestic law.
D. SoUrH AFRICA
While Congress was largely shut out of the decision
making process with respect to sanctions against Poland,
it served as the instigator of actions taken later against
South Africa. After years of discomfort with South Af-
rica's maintenance of apartheid, Congress concluded that
imposition of far-reaching economic sanctions might pre-
cipitate change. To be sure, the world community had
concluded well before Congress acted that not only was
the maintenance of a system of apartheid a violation of
international law, but a violation of the most fundamental
norms of international society, orjus cogens.286
Nevertheless, at the time U.S. sanctions against South
Africa were being considered, no American interests were
being directly threatened; a bilateral aviation agreement
was in force; and the South African airline had been serv-
ing the United States for decades. And unless one accepts
the eleventh hour claims made by Senator Sarbanes -
that U.S. sanctions were justified because the government
of South Africa was in breach of the bilateral agreement
- the decision to impose aviation sanctions had little ver-
tical relationship to the harms caused by apartheid in
South Africa. Did the United States violate international
law by precipitously suspending SAA's right to serve the
United States?
Senator Sarbanes contended that suspension of the
South African carrier's right to serve the United States
would not put the United States in breach of the bilateral
agreement because the South Africans had themselves al-
286 "Ordinary rules of international law are now distinguishable from the funda-
mental norms that permit... no derogation." Lobel, supra note 263, at 1136. As
Professor Lobel explains: 'Jus cogens status for a rule signifies that the world com-
munity is unwilling to permit either a nation or a group of nations unilaterally to
seek changes in the norm. Ajus cogens rule may be changed by multilateral inter-




ready breached the treaty through their unwillingness to
allow certain black South African leaders to travel outside
the country. In essence, the Sarbanes argument was an
attack on an internal political system that had as its focus
discriminatory behavior directed against a minority. But
it was this very same political system with which the
United States had negotiated a bilateral aviation relation-
ship and, indeed, had expanded that relationship over the
course of many years.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention has been em-
ployed by U.S. courts to require "that in the interpretive
process any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty ... shall be taken into account. ' 287 In the case of
the South African bilateral agreement, U.S. practice had
been to virtually ignore the policies of the South African
government related to travel and aviation in so far as
those policies reaffirmed or perpetuated the apartheid
system. Absent from the Sarbanes argument was any rec-
ognition of such United States complicity, making it
doubtful that such a position would meet the good faith
requirements imposed on treaty partners by the Vienna
Convention. 88 Indeed, if Senator Sarbanes truly believed
that the South Africans had materially breached the bilat-
eral agreement, he could have offered an amendment to
S. 2701 that would have immediately terminated the bilat-
eral agreement in its entirety.28 9
287 Frankowska, supra note 264, at 341. "How - and for how long - have the
parties operated under their original interpretation." Koplow, supra note 274, at
1423. As Professor Koplow points out, however, where the President and the
Congress have given no particular or identifiable meaning to a particular portion
of a treaty, "no legal standard is initially created, leaving greater scope for subse-
quent executive or judicial interstitial law-making." Id. at 1408. Arguably, the
Vienna Convention, even had it been ratified by the United States, would not ap-
ply to the United States-South African bilateral agreement since the former was
created after the latter. But "[i]f the Vienna Convention is viewed as a written
statement of existing legal principles, its provisions are binding as customary
norms and are inherently retroactive." Frankowska, supra note 264, at 292 n.46.
218 See Lobel, supra note 263, at 1106 ("No inherent incompetence bars judicial
consideration of whether Congress' asserted rationale for breaching a treaty is
permissible under international law.").
219 Under U.S. law, where one party violates a treaty, the non-breaching party
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If one accepts the premise that the actions of Congress
could cause a breach of treaty under international law, a
logical question would be whether U.S. courts will allow
such an event to occur where challenged. The answer is
yes, but there is disagreement among commentators as to
whether such judicial sanction is legitimate. It is generally
accepted among courts that treaties and acts of Congress
can "nullify" each other in effect domestically. 290 This
means that while a court will always attempt to reconcile
related statutes and treaties in purported conflict, a
court's inability to do so will result in the one "last in
time" controlling. 9' While courts generally try to avoid
interpretation of a statute that will lead to a violation of
international law, 92 statutes passed after treaty imple-
mentation, where in conflict with the treaty obligation, are
domestically enforced as the law of the land.293
has the option to declare the treaty null and void or to continue to honor it.
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 446, 473 (1912).
2- HENKIN, supra note 272, at 33; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 (1987).
-1 The intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not lightly imputed to Con-
gress. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 137, 160
(1993). Courts, when faced with a conflict between language of a treaty and a
statute, "presume that the two can be reconciled." Michael Gerber, The Anti-Ter-
rorism Act of 1987: Sabotaging the United Nations, and Holding the Constitution Hostage,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 374 (1990); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1887). Professor Paust proffers a unique and powerful argument that in a
clash with a new statute, customary international law will prevail in the last in time
battle because "custom is either constantly re-enacted through a process of recog-
nition and behavior ... or it loses its validity and force of law." Jordan J. Paust,
Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Excep-
tion to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 418
(1988). For a discussion of the constitutionality of U.S. violations of customary
international law, see, e.g., MichaelJ. Glennon, Raising the Paquette Habana: Is Vio-
lation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L.
REV. 321 (1986).
292 Koplow, supra note 274, at 1390 n.153.
293 Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973). Although the standard for determining whether there is indeed a conflict
is murky, at least one commentator suggests that there must be some "affirmative
expression of congressional intent to supersede an earlier treaty or clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the conflict ... and then chose to resolve that
conflict by abrogating the earlier treaty." Gerber, supra note 291, at 375. Such a
standard seems logical to impose since a repeal by implication is only appropriate
where the two statutes are irreconcilable. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 548
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There exists some sentiment in scholarly circles that the
last in time rule is inappropriate. One commentator
points out that despite current thinking, the Republic's
founders believed that treaties were superior to pre-ex-
isting and subsequent federal statutes. 294 "Even Republi-
can advocates of congressional power agreed that
subsequent legislation could supersede treaties only for
reasons permitted under ... international law ....
This same commentator laments the fact that congres-
sional power to supersede treaties became "firmly estab-
lished in American jurisprudence" only in the last 100
years.296 In any event, it appears that for better or worse,
the last in time doctrine has been adopted as a jurispru-
dential rule in the United States. This means that U.S.
courts, when legitimating congressional enactments that
conflict with pre-existing treaties, may very well be per-
petuating violations of international law.
But even if the United States could not legally justify
suspending SAA's landing rights by resort to the Sarbanes
position, the United States was arguably not in violation of
international law by imposing aviation sanctions against
South Africa. The suspension of SAA's landing rights
could be viewed as an exercise of a third state remedy
under international law: We were not directly effected by
a human rights violation, but nevertheless chose to ex-
press our dissatisfaction with apartheid through economic
sanctions.297 Does international law permit exercise of a
third state remedy through methods that would otherwise
(1974). In the case of a treaty approved by the Senate, additional issues must be
considered since "[o]nce Congress passes an inconsistent act, a new question
arises: which exercise of express constitutional power prevails, the treaty (by the
Senate and President) or the legislation (by the House, Senate and President)."
Paust, supra note 291, at 402 n.12. Even where a court finds a later enacted statute
conflicts with a treaty obligation, the U.S., under international law, is still under
an obligation to perform under the treaty. Gerber, supra note 291, at 374.
294 Lobel, supra note 263, at 1096.
295 Id. at 1099.
296, Id. at 1103.
297 Support for use of third state remedies in cases of human rights violations
can, for example, be found in the ILC Draft Report of 1976. Charney, supra note
234, at 57. Charney correctly points out that human rights protections are unen-
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be considered themselves to be a breach of treaty and
consequently a violation of international law? The answer
is perhaps, and only then under the most limited of
circumstances.
The ICJ's opinion in In re Barcelona Traction, Light, &
Power Co.298 is instructive as a starting point. There the
court in dictum suggested that certain obligations are
owed by States to the entire international community and
that the international community has a legal interest in
their protection. 2 9 These duties include those imposed
byjus cogens and should be enforceable by third States that
are not directly harmed by violations. 30 0  The notion is
thatjus cogens rules constitute a lowest common denomi-
nator below which states cannot sink. These few but es-
sential fundamental rules constitute a universal bill of
rights - albeit a limited one - where enforcement, by
necessity, is left to the world community.
At the time that Congress considered sanctions against
South Africa, apartheid had been classified internationally
as a criminal act. 0 l Congress would seemingly have been
on firmer legal ground terminating SAA's service by rely-
ing upon its duty under international law to halt the crime
of apartheid and uphold principles of jus cogens - even
when this meant breaching a long-standing bilateral
treaty.30 2 Indeed, Congress could have done the investi-
forceable without the use of third state remedies. Id. at 13. He cautions, however,
that such enforcement may have to be predicated on a multilateral treaty. Id.
298 In re Barcelona Traction, Light, & Power Co., 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Judgment of
Feb. 5).
2-99 See Charney, supra note 234.
300 See Lobel, supra note 263, at 1145 n.371 ("[AIII nations have a legal interest
in imposing sanctions against a state that violatesjus cogens rules, not just the di-
rectly injured state, if any."). Apartheid is considered to be a violation of jus
cogens. LAURIE HANNIKANINA, PREEMPTORY NORMS Us COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 286 (1988).
s0, Goler T. Butcher, The Unique Nature of Sanctions Against South Africa, and Re-
sulting Economic Issues, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 821, 823 (1987). Lobel points
out that the 1973 International Convention on Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, as its title suggests, criminalized apartheid. Lobel, supra
note 263, at 1143 n.362.
.10. See Lobel, supra note 263, at 1109 ("[S]ome significant differences may now
exist between breaches of bilateral treaty obligations and violations of other cus-
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gation and analysis that the CAB, fourteen years earlier,
had been unwilling to do: determining how the policies
and practices of SAA in employment and passenger treat-
ment within the confines of South Africa reflected the
criminal system of apartheid. Had Congress premised ac-
tions against South Africa upon jus cogens, eleventh hour
justifications such as those offered by Senator Sarbanes
would have been unnecessary. Furthermore, United
States imposition of sanctions would have been consid-
ered bolder and more legally justifiable.
CONCLUSION
Generally, when the United States imposes economic
sanctions, established contractual and other international
relationships are jeopardized as private suppliers of goods
and services suddenly learn that transactions with buyers,
both government and private, are constrained or prohib-
ited. Aviation sanctions likewise interfere with these pri-
vate contractual relationships. Aviation sanctions have
been used to alter existing treaty relationships between
governments whose airlines substantially depend on those
contractual arrangements to organize and conduct their
affairs. Aviation bilateral agreements cement relations,
provide predictability, and allow long-term planning in an
industry designed to bring people together. The United
States undermines the primacy of international law and
the underlying purposes of aviation bilateral agreements
when it acts in contravention of those agreements in the
absence of substantial legal cause. This is not to imply
that the United States should abandon use of aviation
sanctions altogether. Rather, it is meant to suggest that
we devalue the effectiveness and legitimacy of aviation
tomary international norms. Certain international norms, which are often con-
tained in multilateral treaties, now appear qualitatively more important than the
general obligation to honor treaties."). Butcher argues that articles of the U.N.
Charter create obligations on the part of States to take unilateral actions to end
apartheid. Butcher, supra note 301, at 830-31.
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sanctions as a foreign and legal policy tool with overuse
or abuse.
The United States must develop a more coherent
framework for determining the appropriateness of various
forms of aviation sanctions. That framework should allow
policymakers to assess both the nature of the offense be-
ing sanctioned and the type of sanction most appropriate
to employ. The answers to the following questions will
assist in the formulation of appropriate U.S. responses:
1. Are U.S. interests directly threatened by the acts of
another country or will the United States employ a third
state remedy? The more the acts threaten U.S. interests
directly - making them closer to the "core" of offensive-
ness - the more justifiable will be a U.S. sanction. Like-
wise, where the acts threaten a third country directly, but
the United States only tangentially, the acts are in the
"penumbra" of offensiveness, making U.S. sanctions less
justifiable. 3
2. Were the offensive acts taken within the domestic
confines of a country under the country's laws? Were the
effects of the actions manifested elsewhere? With the lat-
ter, we are closer to a core violation; with the former, we
are closer to the penumbra.
3. Were the offensive acts a violation of international
law? If so, were they a violation ofjus cogens, a multilat-
eral, customary international law, or a bilateral agree-
ment? Core violations encompass these categories. The
penumbra would include foreign governmental actions
that are otherwise distasteful to the United States.
4. Were the offensive acts aviation or non-aviation re-
lated? Core violations include the former. The penum-
bra is the latter for the purposes of imposing sanctions
related to aviation.
5. Will the contemplated U.S. sanctions undermine an
00- The notions of "core" and "penumbra" are articulated in WILLARD VAN OR-
MAN QUINE, Two DEGREES OF EMPIRICISM, reprinted in LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 326 (William R. Bishin & Christo-
pher D. Stone eds., 1972).
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existing bilateral aviation relationship? To the extent
they will, they are in the penumbra of acceptability; to the
extent they will not, the sanctions are in the core of
acceptability.
6. If the offensive acts constitute a violation of interna-
tional law, what practical multilateral remedies exist to
correct the violation?3 14 Where such remedies do exist,
imposition of unilateral sanctions is in the penumbra of
acceptability; to the extent such remedies do not exist,
unilateral sanctions are closer to the core of acceptability.
7. Will use of sanctions harm the wrong people?30 5 In
the case of aviation, for example, will the sanctions be di-
rected at a government or privately-owned airline? Ac-
tions targeting a government-owned airline will be closer
to the core of acceptability than those targeting an other-
wise guiltless private carrier.
8. Will the United States violate international law by un-
dertaking the contemplated sanction? To the extent it
will, the sanction is in the penumbra of acceptability.
The framework outlined is by no means exhaustive. It
merely suggests that certain issues should be considered
by legal and policy decision makers when contemplating
sanctions. To the extent that the United States addresses
these issues prior to employing future sanctions in the
aviation sector, the country should benefit by the insights
offered by history and at the same time advance the rule
of international law.
3- Some of the practical advantages of reliance upon multilateral sanctions in-
clude: 1) achieving more significant economic impact where most or all suppliers
enforce sanctions; 2) avoiding imposition of an unfair economic impact where
nearly all suppliers adopt sanctions; 3) avoiding divisions among otherwise
friendly nations; and 4) avoiding thorny extraterritoriality issues potentially raised
by imposition of unilateral sanctions. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 1, at 158-60.
305 At least one commentator contends that U.S. sanctions against Poland in
1981 hurt the Polish people more than their government. Fourie, supra note 2, at
922.
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by legal and policy decision makers when contemplating
sanctions. To the extent that the United States addresses
these issues prior to employing future sanctions in the
aviation sector, the country should benefit by the insights
offered by history and at the same time advance the rule
of international law.
